Market Structure and Exchange Rate Exposure: The Case of Consumable Goods by Andrikopoulos, A. & Dassiou, X.
Andrikopoulos, A. & Dassiou, X. (2016). Market Structure and Exchange Rate Exposure: The Case 
of Consumable Goods (Report No. 16/12). London, UK: Department of Economics, City, University 
of London. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Andrikopoulos, A. & Dassiou, X. (2016). Market Structure and Exchange Rate 
Exposure: The Case of Consumable Goods (Report No. 16/12). London, UK: Department of 
Economics, City, University of London. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/16512/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
Market Structure and Exchange Rate Exposure: 
The Case of Consumable Goods  
 
 
Athanasios Andrikopoulos1 
Hull University Business School 
 
 
 Xeni Dassiou 
City, University of London 
 
  
 
 
Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
No. 16/12 
  
 
1
 Corresponding author: Athanasios Andrikopoulos, Hull University Business School, Hull HU6 7RX. Email: A.Andrikopoulos@hull.ac.uk  
 
1 
Market Structure and Exchange Rate Exposure: The Case of 
Consumable Goods 
Athanasios Andrikopoulos*, Xeni Dassiou† 
December 2016 
Abstract. 
We examine the impact of exchange rates on profits and prices in differentiated consumable goods markets. We 
model the exchange rate exposure of exporting firms operating within a Bertrand or a Cournot setting where 
between and within competition co-exist. We show that market structure and these two forces determine pass 
through and exposure. Empirical tests of real and bilateral exchange rate exposure using stock price and profit 
data confirm a link between the ability of a firm to pass on the exchange rate changes to its customers and the 
magnitude of the exposure on their rivals. 
Keywords:  
Exchange rate exposure; pass through elasticities; market structure; firm behavior; Between Countries 
Competition; Within Countries Competition 
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, D21, D22, F31, G39 
* Corresponding Author: Athanasios Andrikopoulos, Location: Hull University Business School, University 
of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK. Tel. +44 (0)1482 46-3310, A.Andrikopoulos@hull.ac.uk. 
†Xeni Dassiou, Department of Economics, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 
0HB, UK, tel. +44 (0)20 7040 0206, x.dassiou@city.ac.uk. 
  
2 
1. Introduction 
In a period of increasing globalization, exchange rate movements have considerable effects on firm profitability. 
Adidas, the second largest firm in sports across the world, attributes the recent downward trend in its profits on 
the continuing appreciation of euro. (Marketwatch, 2014). Such exchange rate fluctuations have less obvious 
but equally important effects on the strategic behavior of firms. Notably, the latter affects not just exporting 
firms but even firms which only operate in their home country (Marston, 2001; Aggarwal and Harper, 2010). 
Our goal is to develop simple and more realistic models of imperfect competition arising in an international 
setting to capture the effects of the exchange rates on the strategic behavior of firms offering differentiated 
consumable goods. We develop two such models to examine exchange rate exposure using specific markets 
where firms compete in an international oligopoly, under a price (Bertrand) or a quantity (Cournot) setting. 
We first look at of competition in a duopoly between two competing firms, one home and one abroad with 
differentiated products and linear demands; the 1x1 differentiated goods duopoly model as we call it. An 
example is the Detergent market, dominated by the British-Dutch Unilever and the (US) Procter & Gamble 
(Economist, 2012a). This allows us to study exchange rate pass-through and foreign economic exposure as 
simple elasticities of prices and profits with respect to the exchange rates. 
In the second model there are two home and two foreign firms; the 2x2 differentiated goods oligopoly 
model. The home (foreign) firm competes with the other home (foreign) firm – within countries competition 
(henceforth within competition) and with the foreign (home) firms in the other country – between countries 
competition (henceforth between competition). We study a framework that encompasses both elements and look 
at the impact of exchange rates in these more complicated competition structures. The addition of within 
competition either in a Bertrand or in a Cournot model may reverse the results found in the 1x1 model for the 
exchange rate impact. Whether this happens depends on the intensity of competition among home and foreign 
firms as measured by the between and the within cross price parameters which determine the degree to which 
goods competing in the market are viewed as close substitutes by the consumers.  
In the 1x1 Bertrand model a currency appreciation decreases (increases) the optimal price of the 
appreciating (depreciating) country. Hence, exchange-rate pass-through is in this case profit enhancing 
(reducing) for home (foreign) goods. The direction of the impact of foreign exposure depends on the price 
elasticity of the foreign competitor with respect to the exchange rate. 
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In the 2x2 Bertrand model the introduction of the within countries competition may have an opposite sign 
and if in that case it dominates the between countries competition the results will be reversed. In other words, 
in the 2x2 case, exchange-rate pass-through can be either negative or positive, because of the existence of both 
within and between countries competition. Foreign exposure depends on the price elasticity with respect to the 
exchange rate of the two foreign and the one domestic competitor. The latter model is flexible enough to 
examine the phenomenon that exchange rates affect even firms which only operate in their home country. 
In the 1x1 Cournot model a foreign-currency appreciation decreases (increases) the optimal quantity and 
profits of the appreciating (depreciating) country. In the 2x2 model we once more find that the between and the 
within competition can act as opposing forces when it comes to the impact of the exchange rates on the 
equilibrium prices (quantities) and profits. If this is the case, and the within effect dominates the between, then 
the results in the 1x1 Cournot model will be reversed in the 2x2 model. 
At an empirical level, we contribute to the literature in three main ways. First, we recognize that we need 
to take consumable products to be consistent with a simple static profit maximizing model where there are no 
current profit spillovers into future periods. Our sample does not include durable goods producers and hence it 
is free from their resulting dynamic interaction effects.  
Second, we examine profits exposure to real and bilateral exchange rates using stock price as well as profit 
data from a novel sample comprising twenty-two multinational companies (hereafter MNCs) from nine 
oligopolistic markets during 1984-2015. While existing studies estimate currency exposures of stock prices or 
cash flows, we study the impact of exchange rates on both profits and stock prices, since as we explain stock 
price exposure proxies for long run exposure and profit exposure for short run exposure. It is the bilateral 
exchange rates that are of relevance to our theory but we also use the real exchange rates which as an index 
captures the economy-wide implications of exchange rates.  
Finally, unlike similar studies, we focus on consumable goods producers engaged in an international price 
or quantity setting oligopoly to estimate exchange rate exposure arising from the strategic interactions between 
and within countries as a result of mode of competition prevailing. Our sample exclusively includes firms 
competing in an international oligopoly, and thus provides new evidence on the foreign exchange exposure of 
MNCs that improve our understanding of the effect of exchange rates on MNCs, a key condition for effective 
hedging. MNCs do not use financial hedging with currency derivatives because they operate in many countries 
where operational hedging suffices. Operational hedging deals with longer-term foreign exchange exposure by 
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the firm changing the location of its operations (see Hutson and Laing, 2014; and the references therein) and is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
2. Related Literature 
The international oligopoly literature is quite broad. The earliest attempts in modelling the competition between 
domestic and foreign firms are based on the assumption of perfect substitutability: Dornbusch (1987), Krugman 
(1987), Froot and Klemperer (1989), Feenstra, et al. (1996), and Yang (1997). More recent models assume 
imperfect substitutability (Bodnar et al., 2002; Dekle, 2005; Brissimis and Kosma, 2006). However, to our 
knowledge there is no study in this literature studying the impact of exchange rates under both Bertrand and 
Cournot competition and the combined effect of the between and within competition. 
The 2x2 model captures both within and between countries competition and studies the exchange rate 
exposure in more depth. Most of the previous literature studies either Bertrand or Cournot, looking at firms that 
either both export abroad or one is the exporter and the other is the domestic firm; there is no study for these 
different market structures in an international oligopoly.1 Moreover, most of the previous literature looks at 
pass-through, namely the impact on prices; we study the impact on stock prices and profits, i.e. exposure. 
Our 1x1 model closely relates to those of Bodnar et al., and Dekle. Bodnar et al. They estimate a two-
equation price and quantity competition differentiated model for eight Japanese export industries during 1986-
1995 examining if the relation between exchange rate exposure and pass-through as derived in their model is 
consistent with actual behavior. However, we think that the type of goods used to study exposure plays a key 
role and the consumable products are more appropriate to estimate a simple static profit maximizing model. For 
this reason our sample does not include durable goods and hence it is free from any dynamic interaction effects. 
Using a profit maximizing model, Dekle studies automobile, steel, radio-and television-receiver and 
musical instrument industries. As expected, in markets where domestic and export goods are close substitutes, 
exporters are hesitant to pass on price increases when their home currency appreciates. Dekle looks at the impact 
of foreign competition on exposure in a Cournot setting and tests whether exporters collude in foreign markets. 
                                                     
1
 Bodnar et al. study both Bertrand and Cournot competition but they only discuss between competition; home and foreign 
firms both compete in a third country. 
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As we emphasize, in imperfect competition it is more appropriate to test a static maximization model using 
consumable goods. To look at durable goods we need to use a dynamic oligopoly framework as Froot and 
Klemperer and Gross and Schmitt (2000) do.  
While Bodnar et al., develop a model that determines pass-through and exposure behavior at the same time, 
they do not study the impact of industry structure on exposure. Marston (2011) emphasizes the importance of 
the competitive structure of the industry in which a firm operates, on its economic exposure. However, he studies 
only theoretically the following cases: monopoly, a Cournot duopoly in which one of the two firms only operates 
in its domestic country while the other operates in both domestic and exports abroad, and the case of Stackelberg 
leadership by the exporting or the local firm. 
Froot and Klemperer are the first to develop a dynamic oligopoly model, allowing the future product 
demand to depend on current market shares; future exchange rates affect the current market shares, and thus 
current international pricing. They study the simplest dynamic game, namely a two period one, under both 
Cournot and Bertrand homogeneous goods competition, with one foreign and one domestic competitor in the 
domestic (U.S.) market. In their empirical part they test whether prices are affected by the perceived permanence 
of exchange rate changes by studying foreign firms from the UK, France, West Germany, and Japan competing 
with the domestic firms in the U.S. market; they look at sixty-five industries for each country during 1981-1986. 
Gross and Schmitt use the switching cost model of Froot and Klemperer, since switching costs are relevant 
to the automobile market. They recognize that price decisions have an intertemporal link in a durables good 
model and maximize the value of the firm, namely the present value of its profits in the simplest two period 
game. This dynamic model allows the study of the exchange rate pass-through in the long and in the short-run; 
their result is that price interdependence matters and that exchange rates have significant feedback effects on 
prices resulting to lower pass-through in the long-run than in the short-run. Here too, the market structure of the 
model is very simple, with two foreign firms serving a market with no home production under a Bertrand setting 
studying exchange-rate pass through, but not foreign exposure. In their empirical part they study the Swiss 
automobile market during 1977-1994 with Belgium, Germany, France and Japan as source-countries. 
In a more recent paper, Auer and Schoenle (2016) study the impact of market structure on exchange rate 
pass-through using data on large firms that can influence the overall price level of a sector under Cournot and 
Bertrand competition. They show that import prices exhibit a hump-shaped reaction to competitor prices in 
market share while for given prices of competitors, the response to exchange rate changes is U-shaped in market 
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share. Auer and Schoenle agree with us that a very large firm can fully pass through the exchange rate changes, 
and also argue that small firms that have no market share to lose do as well. On the other hand, medium sized 
firms can only partially pass through exchange rate changes. However, our paper differs from their paper in a 
number of ways. Most importantly, they study the pass-through decisions of importers at the level of the firm, 
while we study exporting firms. While they focus on pass-through, we study the impact on stock prices and 
profits, i.e. exposure. They only study US dollar and US firms during 1994-2005, while our study includes all 
four major currencies; USD, EUR, JPY, GBP plus CHF and DKK and look at firms from Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, US and UK. Finally, they mainly discuss the case where foreign 
firms compete with other importers but not with domestic firms, so that they can omit domestic prices from 
their analysis; hence they do not study the interplay with between and within countries competition as we do as 
part of our analysis. 
Auer (2015) also studies the pass-through decisions of importers by looking at the indirect inflationary 
effect of an appreciation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) on the U.S. producer markets and the prices of 
domestic producers. Using a panel during 1994-2010 of 519 manufacturing sectors his finding is that changes 
in Chinese import prices pass through into producer prices at much higher rate than do other import prices, a 
“China price” effect. Auer examines how the RMB appreciation is passed on the U.S. import prices and, hence, 
how these import prices affect U.S. producer prices.  
Finally, we note that Berman et al., (2012) show that the reaction of exporters to currency changes is 
heterogeneous: using French firm-level data with destination specific export values and volumes during 1995-
2005, they find that high-performance firms react to currency depreciation by increasing more their mark-up 
and less their export volume. They also look at productivity differences within and between sectors, and they 
study whether the relation between performance and exchange rates is more a within or a between-sector 
phenomenon. While our model emphasizes the mode of competition in specific international markets and its 
impact on the link between exchange rates and exposure, the addition of a distinction between high and low 
performance firms is an interesting future direction. 
The empirical part of our paper relates to the two-factor model where the dependent variable is either the 
changes in stock prices (see e.g. Jorion, 1990; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993; He and Ng, 1998; Williamson, 2001) 
or in cash flows of the firm (Bartov and Bodnar, 1994, Stulz and Williamson, 1997; Oxelheim et. al. 1995; 
Bartram, 2007). Bartram shows that stock price and earnings exposures are similar for short horizons. 
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3. General Framework 
Consumable goods are single-use goods or have a natural life of less than three years; examples consist of 
cosmetics, food, beer, clothing, and footwear. We assume that the home market is USA with a seller of athletic 
shoes like Nike. The price of a pair of shoes is:�ℎ = ܵ��; where �ℎ is the home price, �� is the foreign price and ܵ is the exchange rate. Hence, ܵ has an impact on the home price of shoes. In the empirical part we look at the 
impact of foreign exchange rates on profits rather than prices, since it is easier to find data for the former. 
3.1 Between Countries Competition 
We study the impact of  ܵ on prices and profits in the Bertrand and Cournot models in a setting of differentiated 
goods and linear demands. Since pricing affects profitability, firm pass-through and exposure are linked. 
Whether firms compete in price or in quantity terms depends on the nature of the good (e.g. degree of product 
differentiation) as well as on other structural features of the market (e.g. degree of market concentration), which 
in turn determine the mode of competition. Alternatively, the decision of the firm to choose price or quantity is 
itself a strategic one (Klemperer and Meyer, 1986; Singh and Vives, 1984).  
3.1.1. Bertrand competition 
We have two competing firms; the home h and the foreign firm f, who choose prices �ℎ and �� respectively. 
The demand functions in the home and foreign markets are: 
ݍℎሺ�ℎ, ��; ܵሻ = �� + �ℎ�ℎ + ��ܵ��  
(1) ݍ�ሺ�ℎ, ��; ܵሻ = �� + ���� + �ℎ ͳܵ �ℎ 
where ��>0 and �ℎ > Ͳ are the substitution terms between home and foreign goods in the home and the foreign 
market respectively, while �ℎ, �� < Ͳ.  
While the firms produce substitutes, we intuitively assume that the own price of each firm has a greater 
absolute effect on its demand than the price of the other firm. Marginal costs are assumed constant for the home 
and the foreign market and equal to ܿℎ and �ܿ respectively, such that ܿℎ<�� and �ܿ < �� while the firms choose 
prices simultaneously. The payoff functions for h and f and their optimization problems are: 
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max�ℎ Πℎ(�ℎ, ��; ܵ) =max�ℎ [�� + �ℎ�ℎ + ��ܵ��][�ℎ − ܿℎ] max�� Π�(�ℎ , ��; ܵ) =max�� [�� + ���� + �ℎ ͳܵ �ℎ] [�� − �ܿ] 
Solving the above problems we get the reaction curves (RCs): �ℎ = ଵଶ ሺܿℎ − ���ℎ − ���ℎ ܵ��ሻ and �� = ଵଶ ሺ �ܿ −���� − �ℎ�� ଵ� �ℎሻ. Solving the previous pair of equations yields: 
�ℎ∗஻ = �� (ʹ�ℎܿℎ − ʹ�� − ܵ�� �ܿ + �� ���� ܵ)ሺ4���ℎ − ���ℎሻ  
(2) 
��∗஻ = �ℎሺʹ��ܵ �ܿ − ʹ��ܵ − �ℎܿℎ + �ℎ ���ℎሻሺ4���ℎ − ���ℎሻܵ  
where 4���ℎ − ���ℎ > Ͳ, for the second order conditions (S.O.C.s) to be satisfied, along with �� , �ℎ < Ͳ. Fig. 
(1) shows the RCs of h and f in the price space; they are upward sloping and the home RC is steeper relative to 
the foreign RC. The equilibrium profits of h and f are: 
Πℎ∗஻(�ℎ∗, ��∗; ܵ) = max�ℎ [�� + �ℎ�ℎ∗ + ��ܵ��∗][�ℎ∗ − ܿℎ] 
Π�∗஻(�ℎ∗, ��∗; ܵ) = max�� [�� + ����∗ + �ℎ ͳܵ �ℎ∗] [��∗ − �ܿ] 
An increase in S, namely a foreign-exchange rate appreciation increases (decreases) the optimal price of 
home (foreign) goods: ��ℎ∗ಳ�� = ��ሺ��−����ሻሺ4���ℎ−���ℎሻ > Ͳ  and ���∗ಳ�� = �ℎሺ�ℎ�ℎ−��ሻሺ4���ℎ−���ℎሻ�మ < Ͳ . The positive (negative) 
derivative of the home (foreign) equilibrium price with respect to (henceforth w.r.t.) S is the result of the fact 
that in the 1x1 case there is only between competition. Fig. (1), shows the effect of a currency appreciation on 
the RCs of the h and f firms. The RC of f pivots clockwise when the currency appreciates (and its intercept does 
not change) while the RC of h becomes more horizontal and its intercept less negative, resulting in a new 
Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium, with a higher home equilibrium price and a lower equilibrium price for the foreign 
good as denoted by a shift from E1 to E2. 
[Insert Fig. 1.] 
Proposition 1. 
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A foreign currency appreciation makes the h firm better (worse) off and the f firm worse (better) off if the 
equilibrium prices of their rivals are inelastic (elastic) in ܵ. In other words, as S increases, unless f responds with 
a large decrease in its price to offset the appreciation and restore its competitiveness, h will gain.  
(a) The derivative of the home firm profits is: �Πℎ∗ಳ�� = ��ሺ݉ℎ∗ ሻ�ℎ∗��∗[ͳ + ���∗,�], where ���∗,� = ���∗�� ���∗ <0 is 
the partial elasticity of the equilibrium foreign price w.r.t. S and ݉ℎ∗ = (�ℎ∗−�ℎ)�ℎ∗  is the equilibrium price-cost-
margin of h. Hence, the sign of �Πℎ∗ಳ��  depends on the price exchange rate elasticity of the rival firm; if the latter 
is elastic (inelastic) to S, the equilibrium profits of h are decreasing (increasing) in S. In other words, unless f 
reduces its price so that it more than offsets the appreciation of its currency, h will enjoy an increase in its 
optimal profits as a result of an increase in S.  
The size of the change in the equilibrium profits of h depends on the cross price substitution parameter ��, 
the price sensitivity of its rival to S, and its own price cost margin.  
(b) The derivative of the foreign firm profits is: �Π�∗ಳ�� = ଵ�మ �ℎ( �݉∗)�ℎ∗��∗[��ℎ∗,� − ͳ], where ��ℎ∗,� = ��ℎ∗�� ��ℎ∗>0 
is the partial elasticity of the equilibrium home price w.r.t. S and �݉∗ = ��∗−����∗  the equilibrium price cost margin 
of f. Again, the sign of  
�Π�∗ಳ��  depends on the price elasticity of the rival w.r.t. S. If the equilibrium price of h is 
elastic (inelastic) w.r.t. ܵ, the profits of f are increasing (decreasing) in S. Hence the profits of f, whose currency 
appreciates, will decrease unless h more than counteracts its gain in competitiveness through a more than 
offsetting increase in its equilibrium price. So the size of the change in the equilibrium profits of f will depend 
on its own price cost margin, the degree of substitutability between the two goods parameter �ℎ , and the 
sensitivity of the equilibrium price of h to the exchange rate; it is also inversely dependent on the square of ܵ. 
 Proof. 
Please refer to the Mathematical Appendix (henceforth MA). 
3.1.2. Cournot competition 
In this part we study the impact of foreign exchange rates on equilibrium prices and profits in the Cournot model 
with differentiated goods, so we invert (1) to obtain the prices that “clear” the markets for given outputs. Hence: 
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�ℎ(ݍℎ, ݍ�; ܵ) = ��ܵ�� − ����ܽ + ��ܽ ݍℎ − ��ܽ ܵݍ� 
(3) ��ሺݍℎ, ݍ�; ܵሻ = �ℎ�� − �ℎ��ܵܽܵ − �ℎ ͳܵܽ ݍℎ + �ℎܽ ݍ� 
where, ܽ = �ℎ�� − ���ℎ > Ͳ. The payoffs for h and f are their profits and their optimization problems are: max௤ℎ Πℎ(ݍℎ, ݍ�; ܵ) =max௤ℎ ݍℎ[�����−����� + ��� ݍℎ − ��� ܵݍ� − ܿℎ]. max௤� Π�(ݍℎ, ݍ�; ܵ) =max௤� ݍ�[�ℎ�� − �ℎ��ܵܽܵ − �ℎ ͳܵܽ ݍℎ + �ℎܽ ݍ� − �ܿ] 
To obtain the reaction function of h, we optimize ݍℎ  given ݍ� : ݍℎ = ଵଶ�� [ܽܿℎ − (��ܵ�� − ����) + ��ܵݍ�], 
with a slope ଶ����� < Ͳ if we draw the reaction line with ݍ�(ݍℎሻ on the (vertical) horizontal axis. The reaction 
function of f is: ݍ� = ଵଶ�ℎ [ܽ �ܿ − ቀ�ℎ��−�ℎ���� ቁ + �ℎ ଵ� ݍℎ], with a slope �ℎଶ��ℎ < Ͳ.  
As shown in Fig. (2), the slope of the reaction curve of the h firm is more steeply sloped than that of the f 
firm given the S.O.C. 4�ℎ�� − ���ℎ > Ͳ. By using the above profit functions and maximising we obtain the 
equilibrium quantities (please refer to the MA in the proof of Prop. 2).The optimal home and foreign prices in 
the Cournot model can be found by substituting the optimal quantities into (3) (also in the proof of Prop. 2): 
�ℎ∗஼(ݍℎ∗ , ݍ�∗ ; ܵ) =  ��ܵ�� − ����∆ܽ ʹ���ℎ + ʹ���ℎ − �ℎ��ܽ∆ ܽܿℎ − [ܵ����ܽ∆ ] {ܽ �ܿ + [ሺ�ℎ��ܵ − �ℎ��ሻܵ ]} 
(4) ��∗஼(ݍℎ∗ , ݍ�∗ ; ܵ) = �ℎ�� − ܵ�ℎ��ܵ∆ܽ ʹ���ℎ + ʹ���ℎ − �ℎ��∆ �ܿ − �ℎ�ℎܵܽ∆ [ܽܿℎ + (���� − ��ܵ��)] 
where ∆= 4���ℎ − ���ℎ >  ܽ = ���ℎ − ���ℎ > Ͳ. 
[Insert Fig. 2.] 
The equilibrium profits of h and f respectively are (for an analytic expression of the profits see the proof of Prop. 
2): 
Πℎ஼(ݍℎ∗ , ݍ�∗ ; ܵ) = max௤ℎ ݍℎ [��ܵ�� − ����ܽ + ��ܽ ݍℎ − ��ܽ ܵݍ� − ܿℎ] Π�஼(ݍℎ∗ , ݍ�∗ ; ܵ) = max௤� ݍ� [�ℎ�� − �ℎ��ܽ − �ℎ ͳܵܽ ݍℎ + �ℎܽ ݍ� − �ܿ] 
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or: Πℎ∗஼(ݍℎ∗ , ݍ�∗ ; ܵ) = [�ℎ∗஼ − ܿℎ]ݍℎ∗஼ and Π�∗஼(ݍℎ∗ , ݍ�∗ ; ܵ)=[��∗஼ − �ܿ]ݍ�∗஼. The proposition below summarizes the 
impact of a change in S, on the optimal prices and corresponding profits of the two firms. 
Proposition 2. 
An increase in S, increases (decreases) the equilibrium quantity of the home (foreign) goods and makes them 
more expensive (cheaper) as��ℎ∗ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� = ����� ቀ���ℎ∆ ቁ − [����∆ ] �ܿ > Ͳ, ���∗ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� = −�ℎ�� �మ∆� ���ℎ + �ℎ�ℎ�మ∆ ܿℎ <Ͳ, as ���ℎ > Ͳ and ���� < Ͳ. Moreover, a foreign currency appreciation makes h better off and f worse off as: 
�Πℎ∗஼�ܵ = �ݍℎ∗஼[�ℎ∗஼ − ܿℎ]�ܵ = �ݍℎ∗஼�ܵ [�ℎ∗஼ − ܿℎ] + ��ℎ∗஼�ܵ ݍℎ∗஼ > Ͳ 
                                                                                         (+)   (+)               (+)       �Π�∗஼�ܵ = �ݍ�∗஼[��∗஼ − �ܿ]�ܵ = �ݍ�∗஼�ܵ [��∗஼ − �ܿ] + ���∗�ܵ ݍ�∗஼ < Ͳ 
                                                                               (−)   (+)               (−)       
In other words, as the foreign currency appreciates, the home firm will gain at the expense of her overseas rival.  
Proof. 
Please refer to the MA. 
Fig. (2) illustrates the effect of a foreign currency appreciation on the RCs of the h and f firm. The RC of 
the f firm pivots counter clockwise and shifts inward when the foreign currency appreciates. The RC of the h 
firm becomes more horizontal and shifts inward since its intercept goes down, resulting in a new Cournot-Nash 
Equilibrium point, with a higher quantity of the home good and a lower quantity of the foreign good. Hence a 
foreign currency appreciation shifts the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium from E1 to E2. 
3.1.3. Comparing the Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria  
The Bertrand and the Cournot equilibrium prices are given in (2) and (4) respectively. We next compare the size 
of the impact of a foreign currency appreciation on the Cournot and Bertrand prices (Prop. 3) and profits. 
Proposition 3. 
An increase in S, has a greater impact on the equilibrium prices of the h and f firm in the case of quantity as 
compared to price competition.  
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a. 
��ℎ∗಴ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� − ��ℎ∗ಳቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� > Ͳ and b. ���∗಴ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� − ���∗ಳቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� < Ͳ 
Proof. 
Please refer to the MA. 
In plain English, as the foreign currency appreciates, its positive (negative) impact is greater, in absolute terms, 
on the home (foreign) equilibrium price in quantity as compared to price competition. It is easy to check that as 
the degree of substitutability between the home and the foreign goods in the home (foreign) market �� > Ͳ 
(�ℎ > Ͳሻ increases, (��ℎ∗಴�� − ��ℎ∗ಳ�� ) (|���∗಴�� − ���∗ಳ�� |) increase too. 
We have shown that an increase in S makes the home goods more expensive and their foreign rivals cheaper 
irrespectively of the competition framework (quantity or price competition), namely: ��ℎ∗ಳቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� >Ͳ, ��ℎ∗಴ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ��  > Ͳ and ���∗ಳቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� < Ͳ, ���∗಴ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� < Ͳ . We have also proved that this impact is greater in 
the case of quantity as compared to price competition, namely:
��ℎ∗಴ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� − ��ℎ∗ಳቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� > Ͳ, ���∗಴ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� −���∗ಳቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�� < Ͳ. An interesting question is whether the home (foreign) firm passes on more than the full 
foreign-exchange rate increase (decrease) to consumers. Following Bodnar et al. (2002) we define pass through 
elasticity as ��ℓ∗ಳ� =  �ln� ℓ∗ಳቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�ln ሺ�ሻ , ��ℓ∗಴� = �ln� ℓ∗಴ቀ௤ℎ∗ ,௤�∗ ;�ቁ�௟௡ሺ�ሻ  , for  ℓ = ℎ, ݂. 
Hence if a one percent change in ܵ leads to a higher than one percent change in the same (opposite) 
direction in �ℎ (��ሻ, then this implies that more than the full foreign (home) exchange rate change has been 
passed through into the price of the home (foreign) goods. 
We follow Bodnar et al. setting foreign economic exposure as the percentage change in profits induced by 
a one percent change in the exchange rate, the elasticity of profits w.r.t. the exchange rate: 
�lnΠℎಳ∗�௟௡� , �௟௡Πℎ಴∗�௟௡� , �lnΠ�ಳ∗�௟௡� , �lnΠ�಴∗�௟௡� .  A significant factor of economic exposure is the degree of competition of the 
market in which a firm operates (Marston, 2001).  
As we proved earlier firms differ in the direction and the sensitivity of their equilibrium profits to exchange 
rates, depending on the competition framework within which they operate. Hence we have shown in the Bertrand 
model that there is a link between the ability of each firm to pass on the exchange rate change in the price it 
charges its customers and the direction and degree of the impact on the profits of the other firm as result of S. 
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Hence in price competition a foreign currency appreciation makes the h firm better (worse) off and the f firm 
worse (better) off if the equilibrium prices of their rivals are inelastic (elastic) to ܵ. On the other hand, in Cournot 
competition the direction of the impact is clear; a foreign currency appreciation makes the h firm better (worse) 
off and the f firm worse (better) off irrespective of the elasticity of the equilibrium prices of their rivals wr.t. S; 
of course the size of the impact of S on the home and foreign profits respectively still depends on � and � and 
the costs in both markets. We note that the above results also cover the cases where one of the two firms is a 
monopoly in its home market and competes in the foreign market with the domestic firm there i.e. ��=0 and �ℎ > Ͳ or �� > Ͳ and �ℎ = Ͳ.  Hence, exchange rate fluctuations affect not just exporting firms but even firms 
which focus in their home country (Marston; Aggarwal and Harper).  
3.2. Between and Within Countries Competition 
We now extend our previous setting to one with two home and two foreign firms. Each h (f) firm competes with 
another h (f) firm - within competition, and also with the f (h) firms in the other market - between competition. 
We study the impact of exchange rates on profits and prices in a common setting of differentiated goods and 
linear demands, when firms compete in prices or quantities.  
3.2.1. Between and Within Countries Bertrand Competition 
Both the two h and the two f firms choose prices �௜,ℎ and �௝,� ,݅ = ͳ,ʹ, and ݆ = ͳ,ʹ respectively, and the four 
demand functions in matrix form are as follows: 
[  
  ݍଵ,ℎ(�ℎ, ��; ܵ)ݍଶ,ℎ(�ℎ, ��; ܵ)ݍଵ,�(�ℎ, ��; ܵ)ݍଶ,�(�ℎ, ��; ܵ)]  
  = [  
 �ଵ,��ଶ,��ଵ,��ଶ,�]  
 + [   
  �ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,ℎ �ଵଵ,�ܵ �ଵଶ,�ܵ�ଶଵ,ℎ �ଶଶ,ℎ �ଶଵ,�ܵ �ଶଶ,�ܵ�ଵଵ,ℎ ଵ��ଶଵ,ℎ ଵ� �ଵଶ,ℎ ଵ��ଶଶ,ℎ ଵ� �ଵଵ,��ଶଵ,� �ଵଶ,��ଶଶ,� ]   
  [  
 �ଵ,ℎ�ଶ,ℎ�ଵ,��ଶ,�]  
 
      (5) 
The four terms: �ଵଶ,ℎ, �ଶଵ,ℎ, �ଵଶ,� ,  �ଶଵ,�  are the within countries cross-price effects, while the terms: �ଵଵ,� , �ଵଶ,�, �ଶଵ,�, �ଶଶ,� ,and �ଵଵ,ℎ, �ଵଶ,ℎ, �ଶଵ,ℎ, �ଶଶ,ℎ  are the between countries cross-price effects. We assume 
throughout that the firms produce substitutes, so that all the cross price effects are positive. The direct terms are 
all negative, i.e. �ଵଵ,ℎ, �ଶଶ,ℎ, �ଵଵ,�,�ଶଶ,� < Ͳ; As before we assume that the own price of the firm has a greater 
absolute effect on its demand than that of the prices of the firms it competes with, both domestically and abroad; 
in other words the direct terms are greater in absolute terms from both the corresponding within countries cross-
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price effects, and the between countries cross-price effects. There are no fixed production costs and marginal 
costs are constant, while  ܿଵℎ < �ଵ,�, ܿଶℎ<�ଶ,� , ܿଵ,� < �ଵ,௢, ܿଶ,� < �ଶ,௢ , while firms act simultaneously. The 
profit functions for h and f firms, and their optimization problem is as follows: 
Home Country: max௣భ,ℎ Πଵ,ℎ(�ℎ, ��; ܵ) =max�భ,ℎ [�ଵ,� + �ଵଵ,ℎ�ଵ,ℎ + �ଵଶ,ℎ�ଶ,ℎ∗ + �ଵଵ,�ܵ�ଵ,�∗ + �ଵଶ,�ܵ�ଶ,�∗ ][�ଵ,ℎ − ܿଵ,ℎ] max௣మ,ℎ Πଶ,ℎ(�ℎ, ��; ܵ) =max�మ,ℎ [�ଶ,� + �ଶଵ,ℎ�ଵ,ℎ∗ + �ଶଶ,ℎ�ଶ,ℎ + �ଶଵ,�ܵ�ଵ,�∗ + �ଶଶ,�ܵ�ଶ,�∗ ][�ଶ,ℎ − ܿଶ,ℎ] 
Foreign Country: max�భ,� Π�(�ℎ , ��; ܵ) =max�భ,� [�ଵ,� + �ଵଵ,��ଵ,� + �ଵଶ,��ଶ,�∗ + �ଵଵ,ℎ ͳܵ �ଵ,ℎ∗ + �ଵଶ,ℎ ͳܵ �ଶ,ℎ∗ ] [�ଵ,� − ܿଵ,�] max�మ,� Π�(�ℎ , ��; ܵ) =max�మ,� [�ଶ,� + �ଶଵ,��ଵ,�∗ + �ଶଶ,��ଶ,� + �ଶଵ,ℎ ͳܵ �ଵ,ℎ∗ + �ଶଶ,ℎ ͳܵ �ଶ,ℎ∗ ] [�ଶ,� − ܿଶ,�] 
In order to obtain the optimal prices we need to set: [�Πభ,ℎ��భ,ℎ , �Πమ,ℎ��మ,ℎ , �Πభ,���భ,� , �Πమ,���మ,�]′ =[Ͳ, Ͳ, Ͳ, Ͳ]′.Solving this (for a detailed derivation please refer to the MA in the proof of Prop. 4) gives 
the four equilibrium prices for the Bertrand model (for simplicity we omit the B superscripts): 
�ଵ,ℎ∗ = |
|�భ,�−�భభ,ℎ�భ,ℎ �భమ,ℎ �భభ,�� �భమ,���మ,�−�మమ,ℎ�మ,ℎ ଶ�మమ,ℎ �మభ,�� �మమ,���భ,�−�భభ,��భ,��మ,�−�మమ,��మ,� �భమ,ℎభ��మమ,ℎభ� ଶ�భభ,��మభ,� �భమ,�ଶ�మమ,�|
|
||
ଶ�భభ,ℎ �భమ,ℎ �భభ,�� �భమ,���మభ,ℎ ଶ�మమ,ℎ �మభ,�� �మమ,���భభ,ℎభ��మభ,ℎభ� �భమ,ℎభ��మమ,ℎభ� ଶ�భభ,��మభ,� �భమ,�ଶ�మమ,�|
|  , �ଶ,ℎ∗ =
||
ଶ�భభ,ℎ       �భ,�−�భభ,ℎ�భ,ℎ      �భభ,��        �భమ,���మభ,ℎ        �మ,�−�మమ,ℎ�మ,ℎ         �మభ,��       �మమ,���భభ,ℎభ�       �భ,�−�భభ,��భ,�      ଶ�భభ,�     �భమ,��మభ,ℎభ�      �మ,�−�మమ,��మ,�      �మభ,�      ଶ�మమ,� |
|
||
ଶ�భభ,ℎ �భమ,ℎ �భభ,�� �భమ,���మభ,ℎ ଶ�మమ,ℎ �మభ,�� �మమ,���భభ,ℎభ��మభ,ℎభ� �భమ,ℎభ��మమ,ℎభ� ଶ�భభ,��మభ,� �భమ,�ଶ�మమ,�|
|  
�ଵ,�∗ = |
|ଶ�భభ,ℎ �భమ,ℎ �భ,�−�భభ,ℎ�భ,ℎ �భమ,���మభ,ℎ ଶ�మమ,ℎ �మ,�−�మమ,ℎ�మ,ℎ �మమ,���భభ,ℎభ��మభ,ℎభ� �భమ,ℎభ��మమ,ℎభ� �భ,�−�భభ,��భ,��మ,�−�మమ,��మ,� �భమ,�ଶ�మమ,� |
|
||
ଶ�భభ,ℎ �భమ,ℎ �భభ,�� �భమ,���మభ,ℎ ଶ�మమ,ℎ �మభ,�� �మమ,���భభ,ℎభ��మభ,ℎభ� �భమ,ℎభ��మమ,ℎభ� ଶ�భభ,��మభ,� �భమ,�ଶ�మమ,�|
| ,  �ଶ,�∗ = 
||
ଶ�భభ,ℎ �భమ,ℎ �భభ,�� �భ,�−�భభ,ℎ�భ,ℎ�మభ,ℎ ଶ�మమ,ℎ �మభ,�� �మ,�−�మమ,ℎ�మ,ℎ�భభ,ℎభ��మభ,ℎభ� �భమ,ℎభ��మమ,ℎభ� ଶ�భభ,��మభ,� �భ,�−�భభ,��భ,��మ,�−�మమ,��మ,� |
|
||
ଶ�భభ,ℎ �భమ,ℎ �భభ,�� �భమ,���మభ,ℎ ଶ�మమ,ℎ �మభ,�� �మమ,���భభ,ℎభ��మభ,ℎభ� �భమ,ℎభ��మమ,ℎభ� ଶ�భభ,��మభ,� �భమ,�ଶ�మమ,�|
|  
We next study the effect of ܵ on home and foreign prices and profits in a 2-country-2-firm-Bertrand-framework. 
The impact of a change in S on the prices of h and f firms is given by the vector: ��∗ಳ�� =
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[��భ,ℎ∗ಳ�� , ��మ,ℎ∗ಳ�� , ��భ,�∗ಳ�� , ��మ,�∗ಳ�� ].′ In the 1x1 Bertrand model a foreign-exchange rate appreciation decreases 
(increases) the price of the firm in the appreciating (depreciating) country. Prop. 4 shows that this may not be 
the case in the 2x2 Bertrand model. The introduction of the within competition complicates the results. The 
within effect may be in the opposite direction to the between effect, and if this is the case and the former 
dominates in size the latter it will lead to an increase (decrease) in the optimal price of the firm in the 
appreciating (depreciating) country following a foreign-exchange rate appreciation. 
Proposition 4. 
A foreign currency appreciation makes: 
1. The optimal prices of the home goods more expensive when the following conditions hold for the first good: 
a. [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)�ଶଶ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)�ଵଶ,ℎ] |�ଵଵ,� �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,� �ଶଶ,�| > Ͳ 
b. ܾܽݏ {[(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)�ଶଶ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)�ଵଶ,ℎ] |�ଵଵ,� �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,� �ଶଶ,�|} > ܾܽݏ{[(�ଵ,� −�ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)ʹ�ଶଶ,� − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)�ଵଶ,,�] | �ଵଶ,ℎ �ଵଵ,�ʹ�ଶଶ,ℎ �ଶଵ,�| − [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)�ଶଵ,� − (�ଶ,� −�ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)ʹ�ଵଵ,�] | �ଵଶ,ℎ �ଵଶ,�ʹ�ଶଶ,ℎ �ଶଶ,�|} 
and similarly the following two conditions for the second good: 
c. [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)�ଶଵ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)�ଵଵ,ℎ] |�ଵଵ,� �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,� �ଶଶ,�| < Ͳ 
d. ܾܽݏ {[(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)�ଶଵ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)�ଵଵ,ℎ] |�ଵଵ,� �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,� �ଶଶ,�|} > ܾܽݏ{[(�ଵ,� −�ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)�ଶଵ,� − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)ʹ�ଵଵ,�] |ʹ�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,ℎ �ଶଶ,�| − [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,�ܿଵ,�)ʹ�ଶଶ,� − (�ଶ,� −�ଶଶ,�ܿଶ,�)�ଵଶ,�] |ʹ�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଵ,��ଶଵ,ℎ �ଶଵ,�|} 
2. Their optimal prices of the foreign rivals cheaper when the following conditions hold for the first good: 
a. [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)�ଶଶ,� − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)�ଵଶ,�] |�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,ℎ�ଶଵ,ℎ ʹ�ଶଶ,ℎ| > Ͳ 
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b. ܾܽݏ {[(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)�ଶଶ,� − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)�ଵଶ,�] |�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,ℎ�ଶଵ,ℎ ʹ�ଶଶ,ℎ|} > ܾܽݏ{[(�ଵ,� −�ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)�ଶଵ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)ʹ�ଵଵ,ℎ] |�ଵଶ,ℎ �ଵଶ,��ଶଶ,ℎ ʹ�ଶଶ,�| − [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)ʹ�ଶଶ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� −�ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)�ଵଶ,ℎ] |�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,ℎ ʹ�ଶଶ,�|} 
and similarly the following two conditions for the second good: 
c. [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)�ଶଵ,� − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)�ଵଵ,�] |�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,ℎ�ଶଵ,ℎ �ଶଶ,ℎ| < Ͳ 
d. ܾܽݏ {[(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)�ଶଵ,� − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)�ଵଵ,�] |�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,ℎ�ଶଵ,ℎ �ଶଶ,ℎ|} > ܾܽݏ{ ଵ�మ {[(�ଵ,� −�ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)�ଶଵ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� − �ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)ʹ�ଵଵ,ℎ] |�ଵଶ,ℎ ʹ�ଵଵ,��ଶଶ,ℎ �ଶଵ,� | − [(�ଵ,� − �ଵଵ,ℎܿଵ,ℎ)ʹ�ଶଶ,ℎ − (�ଶ,� −�ଶଶ,ℎܿଶ,ℎ)�ଵଶ,ℎ] |�ଵଵ,ℎ ʹ�ଵଵ,��ଶଵ,ℎ �ଶଵ,� |} 
Proof. 
Please refer to the MA. 
We have shown in the 1x1 case, where there is only between competition, that this results to a positive 
(negative) derivative of the equilibrium price of the h (f) firm w.r.t. S. In contrast, we now infer from looking 
on the LHS of the inequalities in Prop. (4), that in the 2x2 case these derivatives depend on the home and foreign 
determinants |�ଵଵ,� �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,� �ଶଶ,�|  and |�ଵଵ,ℎ �ଵଶ,ℎ�ଶଵ,ℎ �ଶଶ,ℎ|  respectively (containing the between countries substitution 
parameters), the own substitution parameters and costs of the two overseas rival goods, and the cross substitution 
parameters of the domestic rival in the demand functions of the overseas country. 
While an increase in S in the 1x1 model decreases (increases) the equilibrium price of the appreciating 
(depreciating) country, the within competition may have the reverse sign which and may dominate the between 
competition, depending on the values of the parameters. In other words, the within effect allows the equilibrium 
price elasticities w.r.t. S of all firms to be either positive or negative and hence exposure can be either positive 
or negative depending on the relative sizes of these two which in turn depends on the parameters. 
The impact of S on the equilibrium profits of the h and f firms, i.e.:  �Πభ,ℎ∗�� , �Πమ,ℎ∗�� , �Πభ,�∗�� , �Πమ,�∗�� , is easy to 
calculate using the F.O.Cs and replacing the outputs with the demand functions (5).  
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Proposition 5. 
The impact of S on the profit of each firm depends on the elasticities of its competitors, domestic and foreign. 
More specifically, it depends on the sign (and if negative on the size too) of the elasticity of the two foreign 
rivals w.r.t. S. It also, depends on the sign and size of the elasticity of the price of the rival h firm w.r.t. S. This 
is easy to check by looking at the derivatives of the profits of the two h firms: �Π௜,ℎ∗�ܵ = �௜,ℎ∗  ݉௜,ℎ∗ ⌊�௜௝,ℎ�௝,ℎ∗ ��ೕ,ℎ∗ ,�ܵ + �௜௜,��௜,�∗ ቀͳ + ��೔,�∗ ,�ቁ + �௜௝,��௝,�∗ ቀͳ + ��ೕ,�∗ ,�ቁ⌋ 
for  j≠ ݅ ,where, ��ೕ,�∗ ,� = ��ೕ,�∗�� ��ೕ,�∗ , �௜,�,� = ��೔,�∗�� ��೔,�∗  are the partial elasticities of the equilibrium prices of the two 
foreign rival firms w.r.t. the exchange rate S, i.e. the exchange rate pass-through of foreign competitors. The 
term ��ೕ,ℎ∗ ,� = ��ೕ,ℎ∗�� ��ೕ,ℎ∗  is the partial elasticity of the home rival price, a within market exchange rate pass-
through. Finally, the term ݉௜,ℎ∗ = (�೔,ℎ∗ −�೔,ℎ)�೔,ℎ∗  is the equilibrium price-cost-margin of the ith h firm. Here the price 
elasticities, in contrast to the 1x1 case, can be either negative or positive, because of the existence of both within 
and between countries competition. 
Similarly, the impact of S on the profit of each foreign firm depends on the sign (and if positive on the size 
too) of the elasticity of the two h firms w.r.t. S, and also on the sign and size of the elasticity of the price of the 
rival f firm w.r.t. S. This is derived by calculating the derivatives of profits of the two f firms:  �Π௜�∗�ܵ = �௜,�∗  ݉௜,�∗  ⌊�௜௝,��௝,�∗ ��ೕ,�∗ ,�ܵ + �௜௜,ℎ�௜,ℎ∗ ቀ��೔,ℎ∗ ,� − ͳቁ + �௜௝,ℎ�௝,�∗ ቀ��ೕ,ℎ∗ ,� − ͳቁ⌋ 
for j≠ ݅, where, ��೔,ℎ∗ ,� = ��೔,ℎ∗�� ��೔,ℎ∗ , ��ೕ,ℎ∗ ,� = ��ೕ,ℎ∗�� ��ೕ,ℎ∗  are the partial elasticities of the equilibrium prices of the two 
home rival firms w.r.t. the exchange rate S. Again the price elasticities, in contrast to the 1x1 case, can be either 
negative or positive, because of the existence of both within and between countries competition. The term ��ೕ,�∗ ,� = ��ೕ,�∗�� ��ೕ,�∗  is within this context the within market exchange rate pass-through, while the term ݉௜,�∗ =ቀ�೔,�∗ −�೔,�ቁ�೔,�∗  is the equilibrium price-cost-margin of the ith f firm. 
Hence profits are dependent on the exchange rate price elasticities of their rivals, both home and overseas. 
The analogy with the 1x1 case is obvious; if there is no within competition and there is only one foreign rival 
the above relations collapse to the relations from Prop. (1) in paragraph (3.1.1.1). 
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To sum-up, in the 2x2 case the link between the pass through of each firm on the exposure of the other firm 
remains, but it is more complicated as compared to the 1x1 case. In the 1x1 case if the pass on of the foreign 
firm is inelastic, then �Πℎ∗ಳ�� > Ͳ and hence the exposure is positive. In the 2x2 case it depends on the sign (and if 
negative on the size too) of the pass on of both foreign firms and it also, depends on the sign and size of the 
elasticity of the price of the rival h firm w.r.t. S. For example, in the Sports market if Adidas competes in an 
international duopoly with Nike, then its exposure to EUR/USD is positive when the pass on of Nike is inelastic. 
However, if there is another domestic competitor to Adidas, say Puma, then the exposure of the former will also 
be affected by the within competitor and its exposure can be either positive or negative depending on values of 
the price elasticities w.r.t. S of the domestic (Puma) and foreign (Adidas) competitor.  
3.2.2. Between and Within Countries Cournot Competition 
In this section we study the impact of ܵ on equilibrium profits and prices when firms set quantities both within 
and between countries, e.g. the Cournot model, so we invert (Eq. (5)) to give the prices that “clear” the markets 
for given outputs. Alternatively, we can partition (Eq. (5)), [ݍℎݍ�] = [�௢�௢] + [ Θℎ ܵΘ�ଵ� Λℎ Λ� ] [�ℎ��], where �ℎ = [�ଵ,ℎ�ଶ,ℎ] 
and �� = [�ଵ,��ଶ,�] are the vectors of home and foreign prices, ݍℎ = [ݍଵ,ℎݍଶ,ℎ] and ݍ� = [ݍଵ,�ݍଶ,�] are the vectors of home 
and foreign quantities, Θℎ , Θ�  and Λℎ, Λ�  are the home and foreign matrices of own and cross substitution 
parameters between home and foreign prices respectively. To solve for the prices, we need: 
[ Θℎ ܵΘ�ͳܵ Λℎ Λ� ]−ଵ = [   
 (Θℎ − SΘ�Λ�−ଵ ͳܵ Λℎ)−ଵ −Θℎ−ଵܵΘ�ሺΛ� − ͳܵΛℎΘℎ−ଵSΘ�ሻ−ଵ−(Θℎ − SΘ�Λ�−ଵ ͳܵ Λℎ)−ଵ Λ�−ଵ ͳܵ Λℎ ሺΛ� − ͳܵΛℎΘℎ−ଵSΘ�ሻ−ଵ ]   
 
 
Θ−ଵ = [ ሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ −SΘℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ− ଵ� Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ ], 
where, �ଵଵ = Θℎ − Θ�Λ�−ଵΛℎ , �ଶଶ = Λ� − ΛℎΘℎ−ଵΘ� , ݀݁ݐሺΘℎሻ = ∆ଵ= �ଵଵ,ℎ�ଶଶ,ℎ − �ଵଶ,ℎ�ଶଵ,ℎ > Ͳ  and det ሺΛ�ሻ = �ଶ = �ଵଵ,��ଶଶ,� − �ଵଶ,��ଶଵ,� > Ͳ.As the firms produce substitutes, the cross price effects (the off-
diagonal terms of Θሻ are positive. The matrix Θℎ is negative definite, since its diagonal elements are negative; 
its off-diagonal terms (i.e. the cross price effects) are positive. Also the “between countries” substitution matrix 
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Θ� is positive definite, since its diagonal elements are positive. We need to calculate the following matrices and 
we can prove that their off diagonal elements of: ሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ = (Θℎ − Θ�Λ�−ଵΛℎ)−ଵ, ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ = (Λ� − ΛℎΘℎ−ଵΘ�)−ଵ 
are negative (please refer to the MA).We also calculate Θℎ−ଵΘ� and Λ�−ଵΛℎ. We show that these matrices are 
negative definite and that their off diagonal terms are also negative (please refer to the MA). Hence: �ℎ = ሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵሺݍℎ − �௢ሻ − ܵΘℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵሺݍ� − �௢ሻ �� = − ͳܵΛ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵሺݍℎ − �௢ሻ + ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵሺݍ� − �௢ሻ 
There is a clear correspondence between these values and those derived in the Cournot 1x1 model, e.g.  �ℎ = �����−����� + ��� ݍℎ − ��� ܵݍ�=��� ሺݍℎ−��ሻ − ܵ ��� ሺݍ� − �௢ሻ 
�� = �ℎ�� − �ℎ��ܵܽܵ − �ℎ ͳܵܽ ݍℎ + �ℎܽ ݍ� = − �ℎܽܵ ሺݍℎ−��ሻ + �ℎܽ ሺݍ� − �௢ሻ 
where, ܽ = �ℎ�� − ���ℎ > Ͳ. The difference is of course that in the first set of equations ݍℎ, �௢, ݍ� , ��, �ℎ , �� 
are all vectors, while in the second set they are scalars. The replacement of �ℎ�  ሺ��� ሻ in the 1x1 model with ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ ሺሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵሻ in the 2x2 model and the replacement of ���  ሺ�ℎ� ሻ by Θℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ (Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵሻ 
indicates the addition of within competition in the model. 
We next turn to the optimisation of the payoff functions of the h and f firms: 
Home Country: 
[�Πଵ,ℎ�ݍଵ,ℎ , �Πଶ,ℎ�ݍଶ,ℎ ]′ = [Ͳ, Ͳ]′ ⇔ [�ሺPଵ,ℎ ∙ ݍଵ,ℎሻ�ݍଵ,ℎ , �ሺPଶ,ℎ ∙ ݍଶ,ℎሻ�ݍଶ,ℎ ]′ − [ܿଵ,ℎ, ܿଶ,ℎ]′ = [Ͳ, Ͳ]′ 
Hence F.O.C.: ʹሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵሺݍℎሻ − ܵΘℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵݍ� = ሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ�௢−Θℎ−ଵܵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ�௢ + ܿℎ 
Foreign Country: 
[�Πଵ,��ݍଵ,� , �Πଶ,��ݍଶ,� ]′ = [Ͳ, Ͳ]′ ⇔ [�ሺPଵ,� ∙ ݍଵ,�ሻ�ݍଵ,� , �ሺPଶ,� ∙ ݍଶ,�ሻ�ݍଶ,� ]′ − [ܿଵ,� , ܿଶ,�]′ = [Ͳ, Ͳ]′ 
Hence F.O.C: 
-
ଵ� Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵሺݍℎሻ + ʹሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵሺݍ�ሻ = ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ�௢ − ଵ� Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ�௢ + ܿ� 
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Solving for the two F.O.Cs derived above, we obtain the vectors ݍℎ∗  ܽ݊݀ ݍ�∗  (please refer to the MA, in the proof 
of Prop. 6).We now study how S, in a 2-country-2-firm-Cournot-setting - affects the home and foreign prices 
and profits. To do this we first evaluate the impact of S on equilibrium outputs. While in the 1x1 Cournot model 
a foreign-currency appreciation increases (decreases) the equilibrium quantity of the firm in the appreciating 
(depreciating) country, Prop. 6 shows that this is not necessary in the 2x2 Cournot model. The addition of within 
competition leads an ambiguous sign for the partial derivatives of the equilibrium quantities w.r.t. S as these 
depend on whether the between competition impact more than exceeds the within competition impact or not, in 
a similar way to the one discussed in the Bertrand model.  
Proposition 6. 
In the 2x2 Cournot model a foreign-exchange rate appreciation increases the equilibrium quantity of the home 
goods and decreases the equilibrium quantity of the foreign goods when: 
| ʹሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ −Θℎ−ଵܵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ− ଵ� Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ ʹሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ | [ݍଵ,ℎ∗ݍଶ,ℎ∗ ] = −Θℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଶ�௢+Θℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ �ܿ>[ͲͲ] 
| ʹሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ −Θℎ−ଵܵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ− ͳܵΛ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ ʹሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ | [ݍଵ,�∗ݍଶ,�∗ ] = 
− ͳܵଶ Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵܿℎ + ͳܵଶ Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଶ�௢ < [ͲͲ] 
Proof. 
Please refer to the MA. 
In plain English a foreign-currency appreciation increases (decreases) the equilibrium quantity of the home 
(foreign) goods when the between competition either dominates the within competition, or is re-enforced by it 
when the latter has the same sign. In other words, if by adding a within competition dimension in the 2x2 model 
we find that equilibrium quantity of the home (foreign) goods decreases (increases) as a result of a foreign 
currency appreciation, then this reversal of signs in the impact of the exchange rate on the equilibrium quantities 
implies that the within competition is an opposing force to the between competition effect and that the former 
dominates the latter. The impact of the exchange rates on the prices is given by the derivatives of the optimal 
price vectors w.r.t. S are:  ��ℎ∗�ܵ ሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ ቆ�ݍℎ∗�ܵ ቇ − ܵΘℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ ቆ�ݍ�∗�ܵ ቇ − Θℎ−ଵΘ�ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵሺݍ�∗ − �௢ሻ 
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���∗�ܵ = ͳܵଶ Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵሺݍℎ∗ − �௢ሻ − ͳܵ Λ�−ଵΛℎሺ�ଵଵሻ−ଵ ቆ�ݍℎ∗�ܵ ቇ + ሺ�ଶଶሻ−ଵ ቆ�ݍ�∗�ܵ ቇ 
Finally, the derivatives of the profit vectors w.r.t. S as set out below measure the impact of the exchange rate on 
the equilibrium profits of the two h firms and two f firms respectively: 
�Πℎ∗�ܵ = �ݍℎ∗ [�ℎ∗ − ܿℎ]�ܵ = �ݍℎ∗�ܵ [�ℎ∗ − ܿℎ] + ��ℎ∗�ܵ ݍℎ∗  �Π�∗�ܵ = �ݍ�∗[��∗ − �ܿ]�ܵ = �ݍ�∗�ܵ [��∗ − �ܿ] + ���∗�ܵ ݍ�∗  
The signs of both the prices and the profits are indeterminate given on the earlier results regarding the signs of 
the optimal quantity vectors after the introduction of the within competition, which was absent in the 1x1 case. 
4. Profit and value maximization 
Value and profit maximization are not equivalent objectives as they differ in a number of aspects. The one of 
importance here is that profit maximization ignores the time dependence of profits. In other words, profit 
maximization is a short-run goal, and value maximization a long-run one. To reconcile these two goals we need 
to assume that the value of the firm is a time additive function of future profits as we explain below.  
However, since the value �� of the firm at time t is the present value of its future stream of dividends ��+௜, 
it is highly correlated with profits. If we further assume that the dividends are a constant fraction of profits b, 
the dividend policy of the firm is very simple and stable as the value, of the firm at time t is the present value of 
its future stream of profits, at the risk free discount rate ݎ�: 
�� = ∑ ሺ��+௜ሻሺͳ + ݎ�ሻ௜∞௜=ଵ = ∑ ܾሺΠ�+௜ሻሺͳ + ݎ�ሻ௜∞௜=ଵ  
4.1 Durability and firm value 
There is another implicit assumption in the above model, that the value of the firm is a time additive function 
of future profits namely (time separable over time): 
�� = �� ( ሺΠ�+ଵሻ(ͳ + ݎ�)ଵ , ሺΠ�+ଶሻ(ͳ + ݎ�)ଶ , ⋯ , ሺΠ�+௡ሻ(ͳ + ݎ�)௡ , ⋯) = ∑ ሺΠ�+௜ሻሺͳ + ݎ�ሻ௜∞௜=ଵ  
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The last assumption means that the profits of period t do not spillover in future periods t+i, for i= ͳ,ʹ,… . 
For this to hold we need to assume that there are no adjustment costs, so that the cost structure of the firm is one 
where costs in the current period do not spill over in future periods. Finally, we need to assume that the demand 
is not dynamic; consumers neither form expectations about their future purchases, nor do they postpone their 
purchases to exploit price fluctuations and the product cannot be stored in inventories and thus cannot be 
consumed in the next period (Levine, 1985). Hence, we need to restrict our study to non-durable goods.  
Gross and Schmitt dynamic model recognises that current profits spillover in future periods when the good 
is durable. They also show that price interdependence matters and the exchange rate changes have significant 
feedback effects on prices resulting to lower pass-through in the long-run than in the short-run. However, as we 
have mentioned before, they study only exchange-rate pass through and not foreign exposure in a Bertrand 
model in which only two foreign firms serve a market with no home production. In our empirical application 
we proxy long run and short run exposure with stock price and profit exposure respectively. 
5. Empirical Application 
We study nine markets and in all of them except the Detergent market there is between and within countries 
competition as in our 2x2 theoretical model. The Detergent market is a 1x1 international oligopoly model, 
between Unilever and Procter & Gamble.  
5.1 Sample 
We build an international sample of semiannual data from Bloomberg spanning from 1984 to 2015 presented 
in Table A.1. in the Empirical Appendix (henceforth EA). We look at semiannual profits, converting the profits 
of those firms that release their profits on a quarterly basis to semiannual. We also consider a number of sub 
periods based on data availability to allow for inter firm comparisons. According to Bodnar et al., the 10-year 
period fulfils the need of a long sample size while the form of competition in an industry is stable enough to 
yield meaningful estimates of pricing behavior and profit outcomes. We also, check for any effects stemming 
from the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  
We examine the robustness of the exposure by estimating it for the first 10-year period, computing a Huber 
M-estimator which is more resilient to outliers and by removing distant observations. The standard approach to 
examine the sensitivity of our results to outliers is to examine the standardized residuals from the regression by 
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dropping each observation in isolation, as well as all of the observations simultaneously from the sample; we 
remove observations with standardized errors above 2 or below -2 (results are available upon request). 
Chow et al. (1997) and Bodnar and Wong (2003) argue that stock price exposure is identified better at higher 
frequencies. Bartram uses 1, 5 and 9 months data frequencies; the 5 months are close to our scenario of 6 months. 
Using longer horizons is more precise given the noise in high-frequency exchange rates in relation to the 
persistence of movements with low frequency (Bartram; Bodnar and Wong, 2003; Chow et al., 1997).  
We study exchange rate exposures using specific markets where firms compete in an international oligopoly, 
within a price or quantity setting. Our data includes stock prices and profits from twenty-two MNCs from nine 
developed markets. We use two forms of profits, fiscal and calendar profits after taxes (henceforth PAT) as 
reported in Bloomberg. The firms in our sample are as follows: eight US firms (Nike, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, 
Procter & Gamble [henceforth P&G], Colgate-Palmolive [henceforth Colgate], Estée Lauder [henceforth EL], 
Mattel and Hasbro) whose PAT are in US dollars (USD). Five French firms (LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton SE [henceforth LVMH], Pernod-Ricard [henceforth RIFP], L'Oréal, Danone, Rémy Martin). Two 
German firms (Adidas, Puma), two Dutch firms (Heineken, Unilever [henceforth UN]) and one Belgian 
(Anheuser-Busch [henceforth AB-InBev]). These ten firms have their PAT in Euros (EUR). Finally, there is 
one Japanese firm (Shiseido) whose PAT is in Japanese yen (JPY), one Swiss (Nestlé) whose PAT is in Swiss 
francs (CHF), one British (SABMiller) whose PAT is in British pounds (GBP) and one Danish (Carlsberg) 
whose PAT is in Danish Krone (DKK). 
We chose these markets, and these countries for several reasons apart from data availability. First, we wished 
to study international oligopolies to enable us to test the findings of our theoretical models in terms of the impact 
of changes in the exchange rates. Second, we chose markets of differentiated consumable goods since we study 
a simple static framework and for this we need to assume that profits of period t do not spill in subsequent 
periods. Third, as mentioned above, we also study the effect of the financial crisis on stock prices and profits. 
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that these nine markets are internationally integrated and the world indices 
are good proxies for the global market portfolio. The next section gives a brief description of each market. 
5.2 Markets and Market structure 
We study nine markets in which these twenty-two MNCs compete. Four of them, act in more than one 
international market: Nestlé (Food processing, Pet food and Bottled water), PepsiCo (Food processing and 
Bottled water), P&G (Detergent, Pet food and Cosmetics) and UN (Detergent and Cosmetics). In this way Nestlé 
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faces competition from USD in all its markets and from EUR from its Bottled water segment. PepsiCo from 
CHF and from EUR from its Bottled water segment. P&G faces competition in each market from a different 
currency: from EUR in Detergent, from CHF in Pet food and from EUR and JPY in cosmetics. Finally, UN 
faces pressures from USD in Detergent and from USD and JPY in Cosmetics. Below, we briefly describe each 
market (for full details please refer to the EA). 
1) Apparel, Sports clothing, and Accessories. It forms an oligopoly, followed by a fringe of firms: Nike is the 
global leader, followed by Adidas and Puma. 
2) Food processing. There are three leading food processing firms; Two US firms, PepsiCo and Kraft Foods, 
and one Swiss firm, Nestlé. Together they produce a large fraction of global processed food sales and control 
the world market for food (Market Watch, 2014). Nestlé is the largest food firm in the world (Market Watch). 
PepsiCo is the second largest food and beverage business in the world (foodprocessing.com, 2014) and controls 
famous soda brands like Pepsi, and food brands like Doritos.2 
3) Beer market. There are four brewers, who control about half of the global market. In order of size these are 
AB-InBev, SABMiller, Heineken and Carlsberg.  
4) Detergent market. This market is dominated by UN and P&G. The revenues of UN come from three general 
categories: Home & Personal Care, Foods & Refreshment, and other operations. The revenues of P&G come 
from three general categories: Household Care, Beauty and Grooming, and Health and Well-Being.  
5) Pet food market. 80% of the global Pet-food is controlled by P&G, Nestlé, Mars (a privately held firm that 
does not disclose its financial information), and Colgate. The direct competition for P&G in this market is the 
segment Snacks and Pet and for Nestlé is the segment Pet Care. The revenue of Colgate comes from Oral, 
Personal and Home Care and Pet Nutrition. 
6) Cognac market. The big four producers of Cognac are LVMH, Courvoisier, Martell, and Rémy Martin-Rémy 
Cointreau (Slate, 2008). LVMH is the global leader selling more than 40% of the global production of Cognac, 
and its profits are mainly through its exports (Cognac-expert, 2015). It belongs to Moët Hennessy, which is co-
owned by LVMH (66%) and Diageo (34%). Courvoisier is a brand of cognac of Beam Suntory, a subsidiary of 
Japanese Suntory. The production is based on France. The direct competition for Suntory in this market is the 
account Alcoholic Beverages. The third firm Martell is part of the Martell Mumm Perrier-Jouët subsidiary of 
                                                     
2
 In 2012, Kraft was divided into Kraft Foods Group and Mondelez (Market Watch, 2014), reducing significantly the 
number of observations for Kraft Foods in our sample. Hence, we study only PepsiCo and Nestlé. 
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the wines and spirits group, Pernod-Ricard that produces distilled beverages. Finally, Rémy Martin primarily 
produces cognac. As of 2011, it was owned by Rémy Cointreau, a French alcoholic beverage company. 
7) Cosmetics market. Cosmetics is dominated by a few MNCs: L'Oréal, P&G, UN, Shiseido and EL. L’Oréal is 
larger than P&G and UN. Shiseido is the largest cosmetics firm in Japan, and the fourth in the world (Wall 
Street Journal, 2010). EL is a US firm and the direct competition in this market contains all its revenues.  
8) Bottled water market. This comprises of the Non-sparkling Segment and the Sparkling segments. It has been 
studied before by Friberg and Ganslandt (2007). Nestlé, Danone, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, lead the global 
market. (Research and Markets, 2015) The direct competition for Nestlé, Danone, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo in 
this market are the accounts Water, Bottled Waters, Non-Alcoholic Beverages and Beverages respectively. 
9) Toy market. It is dominated by Mattel Inc., Hasbro Inc., Bandai Co., Ltd., MGA Ent., and LEGO (Economist, 
2013; Time, 2008).3 Mattel, is the largest toymaker in the world (Fortune, 2013). Hasbro comes second (Fortune, 
2013) and Bandai holds the third place (Time, 2008).  
5.3 Empirical Specification 
We follow the seminal work of Jorion (1990) but instead of only using as a dependent variable the changes in 
the stock price of a firm, we also use the changes in total PAT as we proxy long run exposure with stock price 
exposure and short run exposure with profit exposure.  
We examine the foreign exchange rate exposure with regard to the currencies of the major competitors, by 
running for each firm univariate as well as multivariate regressions using the bilateral exchange rates [henceforth 
BERs]. The exposure of the individual firm can be identified with BERs as set out by our theoretical model in 
terms of the firm competing in an international oligopoly with specified foreign and domestic competitors. We 
use three of the four major currency pairs, namely EUR/USD, USD/JPY, and USD/CHF, but not GBP/USD. 
We also, use the following five pairs: GBP/EUR, EUR/DKK, GBP/DKK, EUR/JPY, EUR/CHF. The data are 
from DataStream and Bloomberg. This specification measures how the dependent variable of the firm is affected 
by the changes in foreign exchange rate. So, our estimating equations are as follows: 
                                                     
3
 MGA Ent is privately held and does not disclose its financial information (PRNewswire, 2015). It is the fourth-largest 
producer of toys in the world (Time, 2008).Finally, the fifth producer is the Lego Group a private firm based in Denmark 
that also does not disclose its financial information (The LEGO Group, 2013). 
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ቀΔP�P� ቁ௜,� = ߚ଴,௜,� + ∑ ߚଵ,௝,� ቀΔSS ቁ௝,�௞௝=ଵ + ߚଶ,௜,�ܴ௠,� + �ଵ௜,�       (Changes in stock prices; Jorion 1990) 
             (6) ቀΔΠΠ ቁ௜,� = ߛ଴,௜,� + ∑ ߛଵ,௝,� ቀΔSS ቁ௝,�௞௝=ଵ + ݑଵ௜,�         (Changes in PAT)    (6)' 
The term ܴ௠,� is the return on a value-weighted market index, which controls for market movements. If 
each of the nine developed markets is integrated with the rest of the world then ܴ� is the same for all markets 
and a broad-based global index can be used, the return of which is calculated from the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) world index. This is a free-float weighted equity index and contains developed world 
markets but not emerging markets. The returns were calculated as first differences of each price index and 
expressed as percentages. We assume that the home country is integrated in the world capital markets, since, it 
is unrealistic to assume that the markets are closed to foreign agents as all of them are now easily accessible. 
The market portfolio of the home country is not the one of that country; it is comprising of all markets that are 
accessible to agents in the home country; thus this global approach uses a global market portfolio that includes 
all the relevant securities in the form of this broad-based global index. (see Stulz, 1995). ቀΔP�P� ቁ௜,� is the rate of change on the common stock of the ith firm, ቀΔΠΠ ቁ௜,� is the rate of change in PAT for 
firm i, and ቀΔSS ቁ௝,� the of the end-of-period BER rate of change of its jth major competitor as measured by the 
domestic price of the foreign currency. 4 So, a positive ቀΔSS ቁ௝,� denotes a domestic currency depreciation; k is 
the number of major foreign competitors. For example, in beer AB-InBev is a Belgian exporter and has 
SABMiller (UK), Heineken (Netherlands) and Carlsberg (Denmark) as major competitors. This means that we 
run a bivariate regression with two regressors, the BERs EUR/GBP and EUR/DKK. We obtain the exposure 
coefficients ߚଵ,௝,�  using the above time series regressions, which are adjusted for market movements; each 
measures the sensitivity of changes in the dependent variable of the firm to changes in foreign exchange rates.  
We follow Bartram, who argues that when using the stock returns as a dependent variable we need to 
include the market return to control for correlated economic effects affecting stock markets which are 
uncorrelated with exchange rates. In this way they estimate exposure separate from that captured by the market 
                                                     
4 The bilateral exchange rate, S, is the price of the foreign currency in units of the home currency of the exporting firm. (If 
Germany is the exporter and the dollar is the currency of the foreign market, then the exchange rate is in EUR/USD). 
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(Bodnar and Wong). In contrast, regressions with cash flow as dependent variables do not include a market 
index as an explanatory variable to evaluate the impact of the financial risks on cash flows; hence as our 
dependent variable is PAT in (6)' we do not include the market return. This is another difference in the treatment 
of stock price and PAT exposures. We also test (6) and (6)' for the impact of the financial crisis by using a 
dummy variable for the years 2007-2009 (detailed results are available upon request). 
5.3.1 Real Exchange Rates 
While the bilateral exchange rates are of direct relevance to our theory, we also use the real exchange rate as an 
index that captures the economy-wide implications of exchange rates for comparison purposes and to comply 
with the majority of the literature as explained below. The real exchange rate s [henceforth RER], is calculated 
as usual; the nominal exchange rate N is adjusted for the consumer price index of the specific country. The real 
effective exchange rate is expressed in constant prices of 2010 and it is calculated as a weighted geometric 
average of the exchange rates of selected countries.  
Mainstream studies of exchange rate exposure, use end-of-month exchange rates (Bodnar et al., 2002). 
Jorion uses a RER, while Bodnar et al., use RERs calculated using monthly average prices from DataStream.5 
Bartram estimates the exchange rate exposure of 6,917 U.S. nonfinancial firms from DataStream and finds that 
several firms are exposed to at least one of the following currencies, the Canadian Dollar, JPY and EUR.  
Our empirical application uses four major currencies; USD, EUR, JPY, GBP and it also includes CHF and 
DKK; the data are from DataStream. 6  As an index for the entire economy, the RER is a parsimonious 
representation and thus convenient in use (Jorion). It also deals with the problem of multicollinearity arising 
since many cross-exchange rates are fixed relative to each other, or nearly so (Jorion). However, the RER may 
dilute the market exposure of the individual firm that can be identified with BERs as it is an economy wide 
instrument while the BERs are “firm in relation to its market competitors” instruments: ቀΔP�P� ቁ௜,� = ߚ଴,௜,� + ߚଵ,௝,� ቀΔss ቁ௝,� + ߚଶ,௜,�ܴ௠,� + �௜,�       (7) 
ቀΔΠΠ ቁ௜,� = ߛ଴,௜,� + ߛଵ,௝,� ቀΔss ቁ௝,� + ݑ௜,�          (7)' 
                                                     
5
 DataStream provides a synthetic Euro exchange rate for dates before its introduction. 
6
 Danish krone is pegged to EUR in ERM II, the EU exchange rate mechanism. 
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ቀΔsS ቁ௝,� is the rate of change of the jth end-of-period RER. A positive ቀΔss ቁ௝,� denotes a domestic currency 
appreciation. A positive (negative) exposure coefficient means that a depreciation of the domestic currency 
leads to an increase (decrease) in the dependent variable of the firm overall. In other words, a domestic currency 
depreciation (appreciation) is favorable (unfavorable). 
5.3.2 Overall Significance of the Exchange Rates Model 
When exchange rates are highly correlated, hoping to find individually significant exposures might be asking 
too much due to multicollinearity. A Wald-test can be used to determine whether, as a group, the exchange rates 
affect profits or stock prices. Hence in (6) we use a Wald-statistic to test whether all the explanatory variables 
except the market return are jointly insignificant, and in (6)' whether all the explanatory variables are jointly 
insignificant. 
For ordinary least squares with conventional standard errors, the F and the Wald-statistic are identical. If, 
however, robust standard errors are used, the equivalence between the two breaks down. Since, we have 
corrected our results for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity with the Newey-West procedure, the F-statistic 
is not robust to heterogeneity or serial correlation and we need a robust Wald-statistic to test that all the exposure 
coefficients, or a subgroup of them, are zero. A similar argument applies for the Huber M-estimator. In this case 
the F-test is not a robust statistic as well, and we calculate the Rn-squared statistic which is a robust version of 
a Wald-test. It tests the hypothesis that either all or a subgroup of the non-intercept coefficients are zero. The 
statistic is asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared with degrees of freedom the number of the non-intercept 
robust coefficient estimates in question. 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Exposure to Bilateral Exchange Rates 
We conduct stock returns and PAT regressions for each firm w.r.t. the BERs to measure foreign exchange 
exposure in Eqs. (6) - (6)' using semiannual data setting k= 1. The exposure coefficient ߚଵ,௝,� is estimated in Eq. 
(6) and it is adjusted for market movements; we correct for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity with the 
Newey–West procedure. The results of the univariate (one BER at a time) bilateral exchange rate regressions 
show that 22.73% (five out of twenty-two) of the sample firms having a significant foreign exchange exposure 
as indicated in Table 1, column 2 (henceforth col.). To enhance comparability among the firms in each market 
we also match the estimation periods. For example in the Sports market the available data for Nike is for 1990-
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2015 but for Adidas and Puma for 2000-2015. Hence we also run a regression for Nike for the period 2000-
2015. The percentage of significant results in Table 1 increases when we match the estimation periods to 31.82% 
(seven out of twenty-two), as the stock price exposure of both Heineken (in terms of EUR/GBP) and RIFP 
become significantly positive. All firms are positively exposed to their corresponding BERs. 
In the majority of firms the stock price exposures are resilient to the different robustness checks; however 
they are not robust for Adidas and EUR/USD, Nestlé and CHF/USD, AB-InBev and EUR/GBP and UN and 
EUR/USD. Also, the financial crisis affects the results of Heineken and EUR/DKK and P&G and USD/JPY 
(results are available upon request). 
The calendar PAT for most firms are the same to the fiscal PAT. The calendar PAT are in one period before 
the fiscal PAT for: Nike, P&G, SABMiller and EL; therefore we do not conduct firm-by-firm regressions of 
calendar PAT changes on changes in the exchange rates as the results will be identical to the results from the 
regressions on fiscal PAT for these four firms. There are different reported figures for the calendar and fiscal 
PAT for: AB-InBev, RI FP and Shiseido and we run both calendar and fiscal PAT regressions for these firms.  
Notably, only Heineken has significant fiscal PAT exposure to EUR/DKK (-190.08, p-value 4.05%, and 
adjusted R-square [henceforth ܴ̅ଶ], equal to 12.32%), in the univariate BER regressions during 2000-2015. 
Moreover, we note that some firms are significantly exposed to the BERs when we match the estimation periods. 
For example, PepsiCo has a significant exposure to USD/CHF (1.16, p-value 2.88% and ܴ̅ଶ equal to 8.59%), 
since the three outliers in PAT were all during the 90s. Also, Heineken is significantly exposed to EUR/DKK (-
239.03, p-value 2.69% and ܴ̅ଶequal to 14.99%) during 2002-2015. The PAT results are resilient to the different 
robustness checks for all firms (the results are available upon request).  
[Insert Table 1] 
The stock returns on changes in the bivariate (both BERs at the same time) BER regressions in Eq. (6) for 
k= 2 result in 18.18% (four out of twenty-two) of the sample firms having a significant exchange exposure (Table 
2), which is lower than the univariate BER regressions. When we match the estimation periods the results do 
not change. The bivariate stock returns regressions can serve as an indication of how firms are affected by 
different competitors within their international market. So in Table 2, Heineken is affected by EUR/GBP but 
not EUR/DKK implying that competition from SABMiller maybe strong, while competition from Carlsberg is 
less so. Similarly, Carlsberg faces strong competition from SABMiller but not from AB-InBev and Heineken.  
[Insert Table 2] 
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As mentioned in 5.3.2 we use the Wald-test to determine whether, as a group, the exchange rates affect 
stock prices or PAT changes and evaluate the overall significance of the exchange rate model in those two 
regressions. The results of the test for the stock returns are presented in Table 2, col. 4 for both entire and 
matching estimation periods, confirm what we have revealed for the partial effect of each exchange rate on those 
firms. When we match the estimation periods the results do not change.  
The corresponding results for the overall significance on the fiscal and calendar PAT changes are not 
reported (results are available upon request). No firm has a significant calendar PAT exposure to the bivariate 
BER regressions irrespective of whether we match the estimation periods or not, although the results are not 
resilient to the different robustness checks for Heineken, Nestle and PepsiCo. The Wald-statistic for the overall 
significance of the fiscal PAT of PepsiCo indicates that profits are jointly significantly affected by USD/CHF 
and USD/EUR for the common market period 2000-2015.  
We note that Hasbro is the only firm that has combination of a significant fiscal PAT exposure (14.00, p-
value 2.90% and ܴ̅ଶequal to 1.75%) in the bivariate BER regression, while its stock price is not significantly 
exposed to either or both BERs, USD/JPY and USD/DKK. In the majority of firms the PAT results are resilient 
to the different robustness checks; they are not robust for AB-InBev, UN and Hasbro. The PAT of Hasbro are 
also insignificant during 1990-2015, to both USD/JPY and USD/DKK in the univariate BER regressions. When 
we drop all the outliers simultaneously the coefficient of USD/DKK becomes significantly positive. The joint 
significance tests confirm the results (available upon request). The Wald-test of joint significance confirms the 
results (Table 2). When we drop all the outliers simultaneously the coefficient of USD/JPY becomes 
significantly negative. When we drop the first half of 2008 observation, the coefficient of USD/DKK becomes 
significantly negative. After the other robustness checks it remains insignificant. We note that the economic 
crisis affects the results of Heineken and Carlsberg (results are available upon request). 
Some firms have significant fiscal PAT exposures to the bivariate BER regressions when we match the 
estimation periods; Heineken has a significant exposure to EUR/DKK (-191.55, p-value 4.99% and ܴ̅ଶ equal to 
9.56%) during 2000-2015 and (-239.22, p-value 3.53% and ܴ̅ଶ  equal to 11.78%) during 2002-2015, and 
PepsiCo a significant exposure to USD/CHF (1.14, p-value 4.03% and ܴ̅ଶ equal to 5.79%).  
6.2. Discussion of univariate and bivariate regression results  
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As we noted above, when we regress the stock price of Heineken (Table 2) jointly on EUR/GBP and EUR/DKK, 
EUR/GBP is significant but both coefficients are insignificant in the univariate BER regressions (Table 1, col. 
2). However, after the robustness tests, the stock price of Heineken is again significantly positive to EUR/GBP 
(results are available upon request).  
In Sports, the stock price of Nike (Table 1, col. 2) is insignificant to USD/EUR when we include the entire 
sample period, 1990-2015, as the estimation period. When we estimate exposure for 1990-2000 we find a 
significantly positive exposure coefficient. The stock price exposure of Puma to EUR/USD is insignificant. 
The stock price of Nestle is significantly exposed to CHF/USD and not to CHF/EUR in Table 1, col. 2. 
This implies that the link between the exposure of Nestlé and pass on of its US competitors, PepsiCo, Coca-
Cola, Colgate, and P&G is either stronger or in the same direction to the link of its exposure and pass on of its 
European competitor, Danone. The robustness of this result is confirmed below when we study the impact of 
the RERs on the stock price of Nestlé, which is significantly negative to CHF in its full sample 2000-2015.  
In the Beer market AB-InBev faces both within (EUR) competition from Heineken and between 
competition from the other brewers and pressures from EUR/GBP and EUR/DKK. The same applies for 
Heineken. SABMiller faces only between competition from the other brewers and pressures from GBP/EUR 
and GBP/DKK. Finally, Carlsberg faces only between competition from the other brewers and pressures from 
DKK/EUR and DKK/GBP. The stock price of AB-InBev is not significantly exposed to neither EUR/GBP nor 
to EUR/DKK, neither in the joint Wald-test nor in the individual t-tests. However, when we remove the outlier, 
or we calculate Huber M-estimator we conclude that our model provides a better fit than the market return model 
only, during 2000-2015. This result is not confirmed during the common period 2002-2015. The results are not 
robust for AB-InBev and EUR/DKK. The stock price of AB-InBev remains insignificant to EUR/DKK, during 
2002-2015 (Table 1, col. 2) and after we calculate the Huber M-estimator. However, after the other robustness 
checks it becomes significantly positive.  
The bivariate stock price exposure of Heineken to EUR/GBP and EUR/DKK is significant during 2000-
2015 (as well as for the period 2002-2015), with the coefficient of EUR/DKK not significant while the 
coefficient of EUR/GBP is significantly positive; the joint significance tests confirm the results (Table 2). The 
joint Wald-test also, confirms the impact of the BERs on the stock returns of Heineken during 1997-2015 or 
2000-2015. During 2000-2015, the same period as AB-InBev and SABMiller, there is no change in the 
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qualitative results for the stock price or the PAT of Heineken. When we account for the effect of the crisis both 
coefficients become significant; the coefficient of EUR/GBP is positive and that of EUR/DKK is negative.  
The PAT of Heineken are insignificant to EUR/GBP, but become significantly positive when we drop the 
outlier in the first half of 2009. They are also insignificant to EUR/DKK during 1997-2015 and become 
significantly negative to EUR/DKK during 2000-2015. The PAT of Heineken to EUR or EUR/GBP is 
insignificant during 2002-2015 and significantly negative for EUR/DKK. For the PAT of Heineken to both 
EUR/GBP and EUR/DKK during 2002-2015, the coefficient of EUR/DKK is significantly negative while the 
coefficient of EUR/GBP is insignificant. The ܴ�ଶ  statistic confirms the joint significance of the coefficients 
(results available upon request). After calculating the Huber M-estimator, the pattern remains the same. When 
we drop the outlier, both coefficients become significant, negative for the EUR/DKK and positive for the 
EUR/GBP. The fiscal PAT of SABMiller to GBP/DKK during 2002-2015 is insignificant.  
In the Detergent market, there is only between competition, between UN and P&G. Neither the stock price 
nor the PAT of UN are exposed to EUR/USD during 2000-2015. The same is true for P&G and USD/EUR 
during 1990-2015 or 2000-2015 (Table 1, col. 2). During 1990-2000 the exposure becomes positive.  
In the Pet food market Colgate faces within competition from P&G and Mars and between competition 
from Nestlé. We study the stock price exposure of P&G to USD/CHF, since the between competition stems 
from Nestle and not UN in this market. The exposure is insignificant (Table 1, col. 2). We also study the reaction 
of PAT of P&G to USD/CHF (results available upon request). During 2000-2015, the fiscal PAT are still 
insignificant, while there are significantly negative for 2000-2010. The Pet stock price and PAT exposure of 
Nestlé to USD and to CHF/USD is the same with to its exposure in the food market so we do not study it again.  
In Cognac, LVMH faces between competition from Suntory and within competition from the other firms 
and pressures from EUR/JPY. The same applies for the other firms in the market except Suntory. The Cognac 
market is very interesting as all the French firms have significant stock price exposures to EUR and, except 
RIFP, to EUR/JPY during 2000-2015. The latter is the result of competition by Japanese Suntory, the second 
largest firm behind LVMH. The exposure of French cognac firms to exchange rates and especially to JPY mainly 
comes from the fact that over 96% of produced cognac is exported (Cognac-expert.2010a). Cognac is difficult 
to produce to a country other than France as its quality is heavily depended on environmental conditions; hence 
Japanese Suntory has its plants in France. As the Japanese Yen is strong, Japanese can buy Cognac for a price 
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lower than in France (Cognac-expert.2010b), while the French firms cannot easily react to attempts by Suntory 
to pass on the exchange rate appreciation. We cannot study Suntory because our sample for this firm is small. 
The stock price exposure of LVMH to EUR/JPY is significantly positive during 1999-2015, 2000-2015 
and 2002-2015 (Table 1, col. 2). Unlike the stock price, the PAT of LVMH are insignificant to EUR/JPY for all 
these periods. The stock price of RIFP becomes significantly positive to EUR/JPY during 2002-2015. 
In Cosmetics, L'Oréal faces within competition from UN and between competition from P&G, Shiseido 
and EL and the same for UN. L'Oréal faces pressures from EUR/USD and EUR/JPY. UN faces within 
competition from L'Oréal Group and between competition from P&G, Shiseido and EL and pressures from 
EUR/USD and EUR/JPY. The cosmetics stock price exposure of UN to EUR and EUR/USD is the same with 
its exposure in the Detergent market. We study the exposure of UN stock price to EUR/JPY (Table 1, col. 2) 
since the between competition comes from Shiseido at this market. Similarly, we study the reaction of PAT of 
UN to EUR/JPY and jointly on EUR/USD and EUR/JPY; in both cases the coefficients are insignificant and 
the Wald-test in Table 2 confirms this result.  
P&G faces both within competition from EL and between competition from the other three firms. The 
cosmetics stock price exposure of P&G to USD or to USD/EUR is the same with to its exposure in the Detergent 
so we do not study it again. We need to study the stock price exposure of P&G to USD/JPY (Table 1, col. 2) 
since Shiseido is one of the between competitors in this market.  
The stock price of P&G is not significantly exposed to USD/EUR during 1996-2015 (Table 1, col. 2); it is 
also insignificant to USD/JPY. The stock price of P&G during 1996-2015, is insignificant to both USD/EUR 
and USD/JPY and the Wald-test confirms the results (Table 2). We also study the stock price and fiscal PAT 
exposure of P&G to all three USD/EUR, USD/JPY and USD/CHF and to the pairs USD/EUR, USD/CHF and 
USD/JPY and USD/CHF (results are available upon request).While the stock price and fiscal PAT exposure of 
P&G are insignificant during 1990-2015, variations in the periods produce some significant results in common 
estimation periods. EL faces within competition from P&G and between competition from the other three firms. 
Shiseido faces only between competition. The stock price exposure of Shiseido to JPY/USD (JPY/EUR) is 
positive (insignificant) during both 1999-2015 and 2000-2015 (Table 1, col. 2). The bivariate regression stock 
price exposure of Shiseido to JPY/USD and JPY/EUR confirms this finding with only the former significant in 
both periods (Table 2). Hence, Shiseido is significantly affected by JPY/USD only, implying that the link 
between the pass through of P&G and EL and the exposure of Shiseido is stronger than the link between the 
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pass through of L'Oréal and UN and the exposure of Shiseido. The Wald-test confirms the joint significance of 
JPY/USD and JPY/EUR (Table 2). 
In the Bottled water market Danone faces only between competition and pressures from both EUR/CHF 
and EUR/USD (both coefficients are insignificant both unilaterally and jointly). Coca-Cola faces both within 
competition from PepsiCo and between competition from the other three firms. The stock price of Coca-Cola is 
insignificant to both USD/CHF and USD/EUR for the univariate BER regressions (Table 1, col. 2) and for the 
bivariate BER regressions (Table 2). This may be because Coca-Cola is a strong firm and also because PepsiCo 
is a strong domestic competitor resulting to a within effect in the opposite direction to the between effect. 
The PAT of Coca-Cola are also insignificant to both BERs USD/CHF and USD/EUR, in both the univariate 
and the bivariate BER regressions in all three periods and the Wald-test of joint significance confirms the results 
(results available upon request).  
The bottled water stock price exposure of PepsiCo to USD/CHF is the same with its exposure to Food 
processing so we do not study it again. We only need to study stock price exposure of PepsiCo to USD/EUR 
and in both USD/CHF and USD/EUR, since Danone is one of the between competitors in this market. We also 
study the common market period, 2000-2015. PepsiCo faces within competition from Coca-Cola and between 
competition from the other two MNCs. The insignificance of the results in both univariate and bivariate 
regressions may be the result of one or both of the two reasons mentioned for Coca-Cola.  
Nestle faces only between competition and pressures from both CHF/EUR and CHF/USD. The bottled 
water stock price exposure of Nestlé to CHF/USD is the same to its exposure to Food processing or Pet so we 
do not study it again. We study the stock price exposure of Nestlé to CHF/EUR and in both CHF/EUR and 
CHF/USD, since Danone is one of the between competitors in this market segment. The stock price of Nestlé is 
significantly positively exposed to CHF/USD but not to CHF/EUR, in both the univariate and the bivariate BER 
regressions, and the Wald-test of joint significance confirms the results (Table 2). Hence, the link between the 
exposure of Nestlé and the pass through of its US competitors, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Colgate, and P&G is 
stronger than the link between its exposure and the pass through of its European competitor, Danone. The 
financial crisis does not change the pattern.  
In the Toy market Mattel faces within competition from Hasbro and MGA and between competition from 
Bandai and Lego and pressures from USD/JPY and USD/DKK. Hasbro faces within competition from Mattel 
and MGA and between competition from Bandai and Lego and pressures from USD/JPY and USD/DKK. Mattel 
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and Hasbro are of equal strength and they are not significantly exposed to USD. Unfortunately we cannot study 
Bandai because of insufficient data for this firm. It would be interesting to have data for Bandai Toy firm, since 
in this train of thought Bandai should be significantly exposed to JPY. The PAT of Hasbro are negatively 
exposed to USD. When we regress the PAT of Hasbro jointly on USD/JPY and USD/DKK, USD/JPY is 
insignificant while USD/DKK is significant. This implies that the link between the exposure of Hasbro and the 
pass through of Lego is stronger than the link between the exposure of Hasbro and the pass through of Bandai. 
This is an intuitive result since the revenues of Hasbro mainly come from Toys, while the revenue of Bandai 
from Video Game Contents, and other electronic toys, so the competition of Hasbro is stronger with Lego than 
Bandai. The pattern remains the same when we drop the outliers or account for the effect of the crisis. Bandai 
faces only between competition and pressures from JPY/USD and JPY/DKK.  
Finally, P&G along with Nestlé are the only firms in our sample that act in three markets: Nestlé (Food 
processing, Pet food and Bottled water), and P&G (Detergent, Pet food and Cosmetics). P&G has two strong 
domestic competitors Colgate and EL and four competitors from different countries; UN, L’Oréal, Nestlé, and 
Shiseido. Moreover, it is the only firm in our sample that faces pressures from three BERs: USD/CHF from Pet, 
USD/EUR from Detergent and USD/EUR and USD/JPY from Cosmetics. However, unlike Nestlé that is 
significantly exposed to CHF and CHF/USD, P&G is exposed to neither USD nor any BER.  
6.3. Exposure to Real Exchange Rates  
It is the BERs that are of relevance to our theory but we also use the RERs which as an index captures the 
economy-wide implications of exchange rates and it is useful for comparisons. We conduct firm-by-firm 
regressions of stock returns and PAT changes on changes in the RERs and we measure currency exposure on 
stock market returns and PAT changes in Eqs. (7) - (7)'. 
Table 1, col. 4, reports the stock price exposure to the RERs. We find that 40.91% (nine out of twenty-two) 
of the sample firms have significant foreign exchange exposure. The percentage of the sample firms with 
significant foreign exchange exposure increases when we match the estimation periods to 45.45% (ten out of 
twenty-two) as the stock price exposure of Heineken becomes significantly negative. In the majority of firms 
the results are resilient to the different robustness checks; the results are not robust for Adidas, Puma and 
Carlsberg (results are available upon request). 
The 40.91% and 45.45% are much higher than the 22.73% and 31.82% respectively that come from 
regressions using the RERs. This is expected as RERs capture other factors as well apart from competition. The 
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within competition may also mask some of the strength of the between when the former runs in the opposite 
direction to the latter resulting in smaller and less significant BERs. Indeed a few firms from our sample are 
exposed to RERs but not to the BERs: Puma, AB-InBev, RI FP and Danone. As each of these four firms come 
from different markets (Sports, Beer, Cognac, Bottled water respectively), this further confirms that for some 
firms the within competition may mask the between competition effect on exposure when the former runs in the 
opposite direction to the latter in the market where it operates. On the other hand, the stock price of Carlsberg 
is significantly positively exposed to DKK/GBP and in the bivariate regression the coefficient of DKK/EUR is 
insignificant while the coefficient of DKK/GBP is significantly positive while the Wald-test confirms the joint 
significance of both DKK/EUR and DKK/GBP (Table 2). However, the stock price of Carlsberg is not exposed 
to DKK (Table 1, col. 4). Here we are dealing with a case where there is only the between effect affecting the 
stock price exposure of Carlsberg given the values of the cross price effects of the parameters. 
All firms are negatively exposed to RERs except for Puma which is positively exposed to EUR; after the 
alternative robustness checks Adidas becomes also significantly exposed to EUR but with a negative 
coefficient.7 Remarkably, at least one firm in each market has a significant stock price exposure to RER except 
in the Toy market that neither Mattel nor Hasbro are significantly exposed.  
On the other hand, the percentage of firms with significant PAT exposure to RER is much smaller (results 
are available upon request). Notably, only Hasbro has significant fiscal PAT exposure to USD (-29.96, p-value 
1.82% and ܴ̅ଶ  equal to 4.25%), while its stock price exposure in Table 1, col. 4 is insignificant. What 
distinguishes Toys is that it may be considered as semi-durables or even durables, indicating that long run 
exposure (proxied by the stock price exposure) is lower than short run exposure (proxied by the profits exposure) 
for such goods as opposed to consumables (see section 4). This may explain why this market alone seems to 
have a significant profit and an insignificant stock price exposure. This hypothesis is beyond the scope of this 
article but it can be the focus of a future article comparing exposure for durable vis a vis consumable goods. 
No firm has a significant calendar PAT exposure on RER irrespective of whether we match the estimation 
periods or not (results are available upon request). The results are not resilient to the robustness checks for 
Adidas and Hasbro; for Hasbro when we calculate the Huber M-estimator or account for the effect of the crisis 
its PAT become insignificant (results are available upon request).  
                                                     
7
 However, when we run the different robustness checks the exposure of Puma to EUR becomes insignificant. 
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In Sports, the stock price of Nike is not exposed to USD, but the stock price of Adidas and Puma is (albeit 
only for one firm at a time depending on whether we look at the pre-robustness (Puma) or the post-robustness 
results (Adidas)). While Adidas and Puma are domestic rivals, Nike does not face within competition. Also 
exposure depends on the power that your competitors have to pass on the exchange rate changes to the prices 
of their product; if Nike has more power to pass on the exchange rate changes as compared to Adidas and Puma 
this results to Adidas and Puma being exposed to EUR.8 It is important to remember that the within cross price 
effects are not symmetric, i.e. �ଵଶ,ℎ ≠ �ଶଵ,ℎ so the fact that for Puma the within competition with Adidas may 
mask the between competition the reverse is not necessarily true, as our empirical results confirm. The stock 
price exposure of Nike (as reported in Table 1, col. 4) and PAT to USD remains insignificant during 2000-2015. 
Puma is the only firm in our sample with a positive exposure to EUR (Table 1, col. 4) while Adidas has an 
insignificant one. These results can be loosely (as these are RER rather than BER regressions) referenced back 
to our within and between competition model. In the between and within competition case exposure depends on 
the sign (and if negative on the size too) of the pass on of the foreign firm (Nike) and it also, depends on the 
sign and size of the price elasticity of the rival firms (Adidas and Puma) w.r.t. S. If the domestic competitor 
Puma affects the exposure of Adidas through the within effect, its exposure is insignificant (Table 1, col. 4) 
implying that the within and between effects work in opposite directions and offset each other. On the other 
hand, for Puma the existence of Adidas affects its exposure through the within competition effect and its 
exposure is positive given the sign and size of the price elasticities w.r.t. S of Adidas and Nike, the domestic 
and foreign competitor correspondingly.  
In Food processing, results remain unchanged for PepsiCo and USD between 2000-2015 and 1990-2015. 
In the Beer market, the exposure of the stock price of AB-InBev to EUR remains significantly negative 
during 2002-2015, and its PAT remain insignificant. The stock price of Heineken, from insignificant during 
1997-2015, becomes significantly negative to EUR during 2000-2015 and 2002-2015 (Table 1, col. 4). The PAT 
of Heineken to EUR is insignificant during 2002-2015. 
                                                     
8 The stock price exposure of Adidas is insignificant as reported in Table 1. However, following robustness checks the 
exposure of Adidas to the EUR becomes significantly negative. 
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In the Detergent market, the only 1x1 international oligopoly of our sample, neither the stock price nor the 
PAT of UN are significantly exposed to EUR, during 2000-2015 (Table 1, col. 4).The same is true for P&G. It 
is not significantly exposed to USD during 1990-2015 or 2000-2015.  
In the Pet food market the Pet stock price exposure of P&G to USD is the same to its exposure in the 
Detergent market so we do not study it again.  
In the Cognac market the stock price of LVMH is significantly negative to EUR during all the periods, 
1999-2015, 2000-2015, the same period as RIFP, and 2002-2015, and after the robustness checks (Table 1, col. 
4). However, it becomes insignificant (though marginally) when we account for outliers during 1999-2015 and 
2002-2015. The PAT of LVMH are insignificant to EUR, in all three periods. The stock price of RIFP is 
significantly negative to EUR during 2000-2015 (Table 1, col. 4). 
In Cosmetics, the stock price of P&G is not significant to USD during 1996-2015, the same period as EL 
(Table 1, col. 4). The stock price of EL is not significantly exposed to USD during its full sample period, 1996-
2015, or during 2000-2015 (Table 1, col. 4). When we estimate exposure during 2000-2010, it becomes 
significantly negative.  
In the Bottled water market the stock price of Coca-Cola is insignificant to USD, during 1984-2015, 1990-
2015 and 2000-2015 (Table 1, col.4). Also the PAT of Coca-Cola are insignificant to USD, in all three periods. 
Both the exposure of the bottled water stock price of Nestlé to CHF is the same to its exposure to Food 
processing or Pet Food and the exposure of the bottled water stock price of PepsiCo to USD is the same with to 
its exposure in Food processing so we do not study it again.  
7. Conclusions 
We describe a novel theoretical framework encompassing both within and between countries competition and 
we study the impact of exchange rates on the returns and profit changes of firms competing in an international 
oligopoly. We look at firms offering differentiated consumable goods competing under price and quantity 
competition. Interestingly, a foreign currency appreciation has a greater impact on the equilibrium prices of the 
home and foreign firms in the case of quantity competition as compared to price competition. 
To avoid dynamic interaction effects, we focus on consumable goods producers to estimate exchange rate 
exposure arising from the strategic interactions between and within firms.  
Our theoretical results support the mainstream view that as the foreign currency appreciates, the home firm 
gains at the expense of her overseas rival, since it allows the former to optimally charge higher prices and forces 
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the foreign rival to reduce her equilibrium prices in a quantity setting between countries only competition model. 
However, this result does not always hold in other specifications. So in the case of price competition it depends 
on the price exchange rate elasticity of the rival firm in a market where there is only between countries 
competition like, for example, the Detergent market, dominated by UN and P&G.  
The coexistence of between and within competition, enhances our knowledge of competition interactions 
among firms in an international oligopoly. The between and the within countries competition may act as 
opposing forces when it comes to the effect of the exchange rate on the optimal prices (quantities) and profits 
in both the Bertrand and the Cournot models. One such example is the Sports market (see 3.2.1 and section 6.1). 
We test exposure to real and bilateral exchange rates using stock prices and profits, from twenty-two 
multinational firms from nine markets during 1984-2015. We examine the robustness of exposure using 
alternative robustness tests. While it is the bilateral exchange rates that are of direct relevance to our theory, we 
also use the real exchange rate which as an index captures the entire economy. The empirical results, featuring 
distinctive examples of multinational firms like Nestlé and Procter & Gamble, confirm our argument as derived 
from our theoretical analysis, that there is a link between the size of the pass through of each firm on the exposure 
of the other firm; hence the ability of each firm to pass on the exchange rate changes to its customers affects the 
degree of the impact of exchange rate on the profits (or stock prices) of the other firm. The percentage of firms 
with significant stock price exposure to the bilateral exchange rates is 31.82%, much lower than the 45.45% that 
comes from the real exchange rates regressions, as the latter capture other factors as well apart competition. 
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Fig. 1. The Bertrand - Nash Equilibrium in the 1x1 differentiated goods duopoly model. 
 
Fig. 2. The Cournot - Nash Equilibrium in the 1x1 differentiated goods duopoly model.
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Table 1 
Univariate bilateral exchange rate (BER) and Real exchange rate (RER) exposure estimations of stock 
prices. C denotes common market estimation periods and NA Not Applicable. 
 
Firm Bilateral 
Stock price 
Exposure 
Adj-R-
square 
Real Stock 
price 
Exposure 
Adj-R- 
square 
BER RER Time 
period 
Apparel, Sports clothing, and Accessories Market 
 
Nike Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 1990-2015 
Nike Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 2000-2015C 
Adidas Insignificant  Insignificant 
 
EUR/USD EUR 2000-2015C 
Puma Insignificant  4.0191 
(0.0397) 
10.86% EUR/USD EUR 2000-2015C 
Food processing Market 
PepsiCo Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 1990-2015 
PepsiCo Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 2000-2015C 
Nestlé 0.6588 
(0.0001) 
37.11% -1.4289 
(0.0003) 
50.38% CHF/USD CHF 2000-2015C 
Beer Market 
AB-InBev Insignificant  -4.3280 
(0.0345) 
45.51% EUR/GBP EUR       2000-2015 
AB-InBev Insignificant  NA  EUR/DKK EUR      2000-2015 
AB-InBev Insignificant  -4.2657 
(0.0029) 
40.96% EUR/GBP EUR       2002-2015C 
AB-InBev Insignificant  NA  EUR/DKK EUR      2002-2015C 
SABMiller Insignificant  Insignificant  GBP/EUR GBP 2000-2015 
SABMiller Insignificant  NA  GBP/DKK GBP 2000-2015 
SABMiller Insignificant  Insignificant  GBP/EUR GBP 2002-2015C 
SABMiller Insignificant  NA  GBP/DKK GBP 2002-2015C 
Heineken Insignificant  Insignificant  EUR/GBP EUR 1997-2015 
Heineken Insignificant  NA  EUR/DKK EUR 1997-2015 
Heineken Insignificant  -2.5000 
(0.0345) 
34.15% EUR/GBP EUR 2000-2015 
Heineken Insignificant  NA  EUR/DKK EUR 2000-2015 
Heineken 1.3623 
(0.0252) 
41.21% -2.7447 
(0.0400) 
33.22% EUR/GBP EUR 2002-2015C 
45 
Heineken Insignificant  NA  EUR/DKK EUR 2002-2015C 
Carlsberg Insignificant  Insignificant  DKK/EUR DKK 2002-2015C 
Carlsberg 2.6023 
(0.0063) 
54.68% NA  DKK/GBP DKK 2002-2015C 
Detergent Market 
UN Insignificant  Insignificant  EUR/USD EUR 2000-2015C 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 1990-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 1996-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 2000-2015C 
Pet food Market 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 1990-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant   USD/CHF USD 1996-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 2000-2015C 
Colgate Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 1990-2015 
Colgate Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 2000-2015C 
Nestlé 0.6588 
(0.0001) 
37.11% -1.4289 
(0.0003) 
50.38% CHF/USD CHF 2000-2015C 
Cognac Market 
LVMH 1.0000 
(0.0000) 
76.74% -3.9498 
(0.0003) 
65.38% EUR/JPY EUR 1999-2015 
LVMH 0.8562 
(0.0000) 
71.38% NA  EUR/JPY EUR 2000-2015 
LVMH 0.9420 
(0.000) 
74.50% -3.9826 
(0.0003) 
71.19% EUR/JPY EUR 2002-2015C 
RI FP Insignificant  -2.3914 
(0.0049) 
20.96% EUR/JPY EUR 2000-2015 
RI FP 0.6137 
(0.0006) 
47.56% -2.1517 
(0.0053) 
39.95% EUR/JPY EUR 2002-2015C 
Rémy 
Martin 
1.0979 
(0.0020) 
27.17% -4.9110 
(0.0021) 
25.45% EUR/JPY EUR 2002-2015C 
Cosmetics Market 
L'Oréal Insignificant  -3.3474 
(0.0004) 
29.98% EUR/USD EUR 2000-2015C 
L'Oréal Insignificant  NA  EUR/JPY EUR 2000-2015C 
UN Insignificant  Insignificant  EUR/USD EUR 2000-2015C 
UN Insignificant  Insignificant  EUR/JPY EUR 2000-2015C 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 1990-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 1996-2015 
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P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 2000-2015C 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/JPY USD 1990-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/JPY USD 1996-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/JPY USD 2000-2015C 
EL Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 1996-2015 
EL Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/EUR USD 2000-2015C 
EL Insignificant  NA  USD/JPY USD 1996-2015 
EL NA  Insignificant  USD/JPY USD 2000-2015C 
Shiseido 1.2222 
(0.0050) 
21.20% -1.7417 
(0.0005) 
22.71% JPY/USD JPY 1999-2015 
Shiseido 1.2642 
(0.0036) 
25.59% -1.6893 
(0.0013) 
21.24% JPY/USD JPY 2000-2015C 
Shiseido Insignificant  NA  JPY/EUR JPY 1999-2015 
Shiseido Insignificant  Insignificant  JPY/EUR JPY 2000-2015C 
Market for Bottled water 
Danone Insignificant  -2.3675 
(0.0183) 
20.58% EUR/CHF EUR 2000-2015C 
Danone Insignificant  NA  EUR/USD EUR 2000-2015C 
Coca-Cola Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 1984-2015 
Coca-Cola Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 1990-2015 
Coca-Cola Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 2000-2015C 
Coca-Cola Insignificant  NA  USD/EUR USD 1984-2015 
Coca-Cola Insignificant  NA  USD/EUR USD 1990-2015 
Coca-Cola Insignificant  NA  USD/EUR USD 2000-2015C 
PepsiCo Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 1990-2015 
PepsiCo Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/CHF USD 2000-2015C 
PepsiCo Insignificant  NA  USD/EUR USD       1990-2015 
PepsiCo Insignificant  NA  USD/EUR USD       2000-2015C 
Nestlé 0.6588 
(0.0001) 
37.11% -1.4289 
(0.0003) 
50.38% CHF/USD CHF 2000-2015C 
Nestlé Insignificant  Insignificant  CHF/EUR CHF       2000-2015C 
Toys Market  
Mattel  Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/JPY USD 1990-2015C 
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Mattel  Insignificant  NA  USD/DKK USD 1990-2015C 
Hasbro  Insignificant  Insignificant  USD/JPY USD 1990-2015C 
Hasbro  Insignificant  NA  USD/DKK USD 1990-2015C 
 
 
Table 2 
Bivariate bilateral exchange rate (BER) exposure estimations of stock prices. A star and a double star denote 
that the coefficient is significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. C denotes common market estimation 
periods and NA Not Applicable. 
Firm Stock price 
Exposure 
Adj-R-
square 
Wald-test 
Linear 
Restrictions 
stock returns 
BER1 BER2 Time 
period 
Beer Market 
AB-InBev Insignificant  Insignificant EUR/GBP EUR/DKK 2000-2015 
AB-InBev Insignificant  Insignificant EUR/GBP EUR/DKK 2002-2015C 
SABMiller Insignificant  Insignificant GBP/EUR  GBP/DKK 2000-2015 
SABMiller Insignificant 
 
 Insignificant GBP/EUR GBP/DKK 2002-2015C 
Heineken  1.4566 
(0.0050) 
39.60% 10.2751 
(0.0004) 
EUR/GBP** EUR/DKK 1997-2015 
Heineken  1.3010 
(0.0167) 
40.64% 6.8224 
(0.0040) 
EUR/GBP** EUR/DKK 2000-2015 
Heineken 1.3872 
(0.218) 
39.20% 4.0977 
(0.0300) 
EUR/GBP* EUR/DKK 2002-2015C 
Carlsberg 2.6932 
(0.0019) 
55.55% 15.19563 
(0.0000) 
DKK/ EUR  DKK/GBP** 2002-2015C 
Cosmetics Market 
L'Oréal Insignificant  Insignificant EUR/USD  EUR/JPY 2000-2015C 
UN Insignificant  Insignificant EUR/USD  EUR/JPY 2000-2015C 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant USD/EUR USD/JPY 1990-2015  
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant USD/EUR USD/JPY 1996-2015 
P&G Insignificant  Insignificant USD/EUR USD/JPY 2000-2015C 
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EL Insignificant  Insignificant USD/EUR  USD/JPY 1996-2015 
EL Insignificant  Insignificant USD/EUR USD/JPY 2000-2015C 
Shiseido 1.2399 
(0.0074) 
18.85% 5.1745 
(0.0120) 
JPY/EUR  JPY/USD** 1999-2015 
Shiseido 1.3231 
(0.0042) 
26.99% 5.4002 
(0.0106) 
JPY/EUR JPY/USD** 2000-2015C 
 Market for Bottled water  
Danone  Insignificant  Insignificant EUR/CHF  EUR/USD 2000-2015C 
Coca-Cola  Insignificant  Insignificant USD/CHF  USD/EUR 1984-2015   
Coca-Cola  Insignificant  Insignificant USD/CHF  USD/EUR 1990-2015   
Coca-Cola Insignificant  Insignificant USD/CHF USD/EUR 2000-2015C 
Nestlé 0.8633 
(0.0007) 
48.85% 9.6125 
(0.0009) 
CHF/EUR  CHF/USD** 2000-2015C 
PepsiCo Insignificant  Insignificant USD/CHF  USD/EUR 1990-2015 
PepsiCo Insignificant  Insignificant USD/CHF USD/EUR 2000-2015C 
Toy Market 
Mattel Insignificant  Insignificant USD/JPY  USD/DKK 1990-2015C 
Hasbro  Insignificant  Insignificant USD/JPY  USD/DKK 1990-2015C 
 
